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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF POST-ACQUISITION AUTONOMY UPON SMALL TO MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION SUCCESS 
 
by  
Robert Weichel Reich 
 
 
Most theories in merger and acquisition (M&A) research use an individual or 
group level of analysis and address behavioral issues in M&A integration and adaptation. 
Relatively few studies apply a firm level analysis to investigate strategic issues pertaining 
to autonomy and decision-making authority. This study used neo-institutional theory to 
investigate the relationship between acquired firm autonomy and integration success at 
the firm level. It also sought to identify possible moderating impacts of an acquired 
firm’s pre-acquisition organizational archetype, e.g. professionally managed private, or 
founder owned and operated, as well as the acquired firm’s leadership experience with 
previous M&A integration. Furthermore, unlike the majority of extant M&A literature, 
which commonly takes the perspective of the acquirer firm, I explored the perspective of 
the acquired firm. The study focused on middle market firms acquired by public 
corporations to provide variation of acquired firm organizational archetypes. Our results 
underscore the complexities of measuring a relationship between autonomy allocation 
and integrations success. It additionally expands the exploration of causal antecedents 
that influence that relationship.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The integration of acquired firms into existing organizations continues to be a 
challenging enterprise (Bergh, 1997; Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Colombo & Delmastro, 
2004; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Jarrell, Brickley, & 
Netter, 1988; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Puranam & 
Srikanth, 2007; Raghavendra Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Schoenberg, 2006; Zollo & 
Singh, 2004). Seventy-five percent of acquisitions fail to achieve the targeted benefits for 
the acquiring firm (Marks, Mirvis, & Brajkovich, 2001). Over one third of acquisitions 
are divested or dissolved within seven years due to failure to meet expectations (Kaplan 
& Weisbach, 1992; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989). The integration process can be 
encumbered by control change, employee allegiances, strategic shifts and cultural 
modifications (Graebner, 2004). 
To enhance ownership transitions, assimilation processes should recognize 
autonomy dynamics, which support the acquired company integration while 
incorporating new strategies, visions, processes and decision-making authority 
(Brockhaus, 1975; Graebner, 2004). Autonomy implies that the management of the 
acquired firm has the freedom of influencing events and making the day-to-day operating 
decisions without excessively close control or restraint by the parent company (Hayes, 
1979). Influences of new ownership may be particularly disruptive when smaller
14 
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 businesses are acquired by larger, publicly traded corporations (Raquib, Musif, & 
Mohamed, 2003b). In this scenario, a change in managerial authority has been identified 
as a complicating dynamic during integration (Bezrukova, Thatcher, Jehn, & Spell, 2012; 
Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Smaller firms often allocate greater decision-making authority to 
managers than larger, publicly traded firms (Ahlers, Hack, & Kellermanns, 2012; 
Mintzberg & Bourgault, 2000). Accordingly, it is important to recognize how employees 
of acquired firms react to changes in autonomy allocation in order to better plan 
integration into a new organizational model (Nelson, 2003). This dissertation suggests 
that founder owner-operator leaders have less success integrating into public corporations 
than professionally managed private firm leaders (Schein, 1983). The study also 
investigates possible moderating effects of prior experience with acquisition. “There is a 
real role for management academics here… It is strategies’ job to link corporate, 
structural, operational and behavioral conditions and choices” (Nelson, 2003, pp. 
722,723). 
Substantial research has been conducted concerning the social and cultural aspects 
of merging groups. Leadership influences, in-group/out-group dynamics, communication, 
trust factors and emotional quotients are common areas of merger and acquisition study 
(Bezrukova, et al., 2012; Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Merger and acquisition research is 
frequently focused on individual and group response to being acquired. Less research has 
addressed the implications of autonomy allocation such as the freedom to plan, pace, 
execute the integration plan without undo parental interference and its relationship to 
integration success (Meyer, 2001; Teerikangas, 2012). This study contributes to closing 
that gap. Additionally, no prior research addressed the unique institutionalized 
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heterogeneity of dissimilar organizational archetypes upon acquired firm integration 
success. Specifically, this dissertation extends research of post-merger integration by 
providing an acquired firm perspective and exploring the moderating effect of pre-
acquisition organizational archetypes on an acquired firm perceived assimilation success. 
An ‘archetype’ refers to a configuration of structures and systems that are embedded in 
the political and organizational structure of the firm and are organically sustained to 
ensure conformity and sustainability (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Configurations are sets 
of practices that share common praxis along operational characteristics such as policy, 
structure, and decision processes (Ferguson & Ketchen, 1999). The study is framed in 
small and middle market acquisitions to provide a focused perspective on professionally 
managed private and founder owned and operated organizational archetypes (Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992; Filion, 1990; Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The dissertation fills the current 
literature gap in three ways: First, it explores the acquired firm leaders’ perspective of 
post-acquisition autonomy allocation upon integration success. Second, it assesses a 
possible moderating effect of previous organizational management type, i.e. private 
professionally managed firm or founder-owned and operated firm on integration success. 
Third, it investigates potential influence of the acquired firm’s top management team 
(TMT) recent acquisition experience on perceived integration performance of the 
acquired firm.  
The foundation of this dissertation is built upon institutionalism of organizational 
type and new-institutional theory. Institutional theory of the firm suggests the sociology 
of organizations is necessary to understand the substance of interactions between 
governance mechanisms and responses to signals and actions in an attempt to maintain 
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relevance to those affected (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008). Formal 
organizations operate as systems of coordinated and controlled processes existing within 
predetermined networks of practices and procedures defined by the culture and nature of 
the organizational type (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The neo-institutional school further 
develops institutional research around how the agent is managed or controlled by the 
organization to further the institutional values (Commons, 1921; Simons & Ingram, 
1997). Particular concern of neo-institutionalism is associated with economic transactions 
within rules and processes that affect individuals and contribute to the development of 
organizational culture, practices and success (Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Williamson, 1985; 
Zucker, 1977).  
Within the tenets of neo-institutional theory are the isomorphic concepts of forced 
coercion, normative best practice adoption and mimetic replication. Institutional 
isomorphism refers to an organizational structure imposed by internal or external forces 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism regards forces from a dominant 
entity as drivers of culture and actions. Such forces may be derived from government or 
regulatory statutes, but may also be imposed by other forces of control such as an 
acquiring owner (Benders, Batenburg, & van der Blonk, 2006). Mimetic forces 
encourage imitation of preexisting conditions that are diffused through interaction with 
other professionals, organizations or institutions (Bala & Venkatesh, 2007; Oliver, 1991). 
Normative pressures are brought about by professional organizations’ institutional norms 
and standard operating procedures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977). Such 
pressures are commonly transferred through organizational assimilation, cultural 
adaptation or institutional inducement (Ang et al., 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
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Oliver, 1988). These pressures are endemic to the organization from an institutional 
perspective and are implied and enforced through governance mechanisms such as 
decision-making authority (Knudsen, 1995; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2012; 
Nelson & Winter, 1995). 
This dissertation makes the case for the existence of embedded coercive 
institutional and bureaucratic influences that subsist within organizations to sustain and 
promote the institutionalism of the firm that consequently have significant effect on 
leaders from different organizational archetypes and is particularly evident when exposed 
to change (Adler & Borys, 1996; Mintzberg, 1979). Change is understood in 
organizational archetype theory as the blending, borrowing, instituting or leveraging 
artifacts and learnings between archetypes (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003). The use of 
organizational archetypes for identifying autonomy change dynamics supports merger 
and acquisition research and is relevant to research of comparative governance 
mechanisms (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Compartmentalizing organizational 
decision-making control and authority through the use of archetypical organizations 
provides succinct differentiation of institutional differences for analysis (Miller & 
Friesen, 1980; Vosselman, 2002). Archetypical categorization is useful in merger and 
acquisition research to recognize differences in organizational response to integration 
strategies of an acquiring firm (Pinnington & Morris, 2002).  
Small and medium enterprise (SME) organizational structures often are simpler 
than those of larger public firms (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The founder-operator in 
particular is more likely to be directly in control of operational functions and decision-
making (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fahlenbrach, 2010). The owner-manager is also the 
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person who develops and carries out visions and controls activities, demanding a high 
need for independence and autonomy (Filion, 1990). Conversely, the need for 
independence and autonomy, combined with a low propensity to delegate or consult, may 
be obstacles to participatory management or decision sharing resulting in a perceived 
reduction autonomy and power (Mickelson & Worley, 2003). As a result, the SME 
managers may be likely to regard integration with new control management as a threat, a 
loss of freedom, an imposition of standards, and a risk to pre-acquisition authority 
(Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). 
The theoretical hypotheses presented are explored through perceived change of 
autonomy and its relationship to integration success of acquired firms from the 
perspective of the acquired firm leadership within specific organizational archetypes. The 
dissertation addresses small and medium enterprises defined as businesses employing 
fewer than 500 employees at time of acquisition (United States International Trade 
Commission, 2010). Ownership change of small to medium enterprises often results in 
dynamics which produce turbulence within the acquired company (Puranam & Srikanth, 
2007). The ensuing turbulence can interfere with the efficient and economic flow of 
production (Zollo & Singh, 2004). 
Subject firms include professionally managed private firms and founder owned 
and operated businesses acquired by publicly traded companies. Professionally managed 
private firms and founder owned and operated firms typically represent distinct sources 
of power and cultural institutionalization within the firm (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Nelson, 
2003; Schein, 1983; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The concentration on small to medium 
enterprises facilitates the study of the impacts of decision-making authority change on the 
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ability of smaller acquired firms to meet new owner objectives and adapt to decision-
making control changes operationalized by the acquiring firm (Bains, 2007; Gelinas & 
Bigras, 2004; Van Teeffelen & Peek, 2008). The dissertation does not measure the effects 
of resource allocation provided to the acquiring firm, but instead, it focuses on the impact 
of institutional control changes upon the acquired organization and its influence on short-
term integration performance. The results contribute to merger and acquisition literature 
of middle and small market firms in relation to the timing of integration and assimilation 
effects of heterogeneous organizational types from the perspective of leadership of the 
acquired firm. The study also provides insight for practitioners in the development of 
integration processes of smaller firms of differing organizational legacy. 
The next section provides a review of current literature identifying various 
behavioral, social, cultural and institutional treatments of acquisition and integration 
research. The review of social and behavioral theory is important to understand how 
institutional mechanisms affect human reaction to environmental change and conscious 
or unconscious emic response related to perceptions, actions and performance (Van 
Teeffelen & Peek, 2008). The literature review continues with an examination of studies 
reflecting neo-institutional isomorphic treatment of acquired firm autonomy. The 
subsequent section presents the hypotheses regarding the effects of autonomy on the 
perceived success of the integration process with support from a neo-institutional view of 
organizations as institutions. The methodology section provides a description of intended 
empirical approach along with the data sources. The completed research concludes with 
discussion, limitations and implications for practitioners along with additional research 
suggestions.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature supporting the development of this proposal was sourced from 
databases accessed through Google Scholar, EBSCO, Horace W. Sturgis Library at 
Kennesaw State University and the University of Georgia library system, ELSEVIER, 
Scopus and Science Direct, JSTOR, Sage Publications among others. Key word searches 
included, but were not limited to, mergers, acquisitions, autonomy, decision-making 
authority, post-acquisition integration, acquisition value, consolidation, power, change 
management, organizational change, acculturation, business integration, institutionalism 
and neo-institutionalism. 
Several theoretical lenses regarding organizational change emerged from the 
review of the literature using above keywords. Much of the merger and acquisition 
literature examines the human impact of organizational change. Many articles addressed 
reactions of individual and groups to changes in authority resulting from integration or 
assimilation by a new organization. Although these studies relied on behavioral or 
economic choice theories, they serve best to create a foundation for understanding the 
antecedents of reaction to change subsequent of a merger or acquisition (Teerikangas, 
2012).  
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Adaptation to Organizational Change 
The literature indicates that post-acquisition assimilation success is significantly 
dependent upon individual leadership reaction to changes in authority and decision-
making privileges (Bezrukova, et al., 2012; Brock, 2003; Brockhaus, 1975; Graebner, 
2004; Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Discontinuity with former roles, decision-making allocations 
and perceived standing among peers often leads to dysfunctional or unsuccessful 
outcomes (Evans & Reiser, 2004; King, 2002; Krug & Aguilera, 2005). 
Decision-making authority within an organization is often regulated by the rules, 
practices and controls enforced by the firm (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Scott, 2008a; 
Veliyath & Hermanson, 1997; Zucker, 1983). Neo-institutional theory explains how 
rules, practices and hierarchies become entrenched within organizations (Reed, 2001; 
Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, & Zilber, 2010; Weber, 1947; Zucker, 1983). 
Neo-institutionalism refers to the analysis of organizational bureaucracy within the 
cultural institutionalism of organizations as a subset of institutional development 
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Reed, 2001; Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Suddaby, et al., 
2010; Weber & Glynn, 2006). Organizations may have common structure based upon 
ownership orientation and/or environmental guidelines (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; 
Zucker, 1983). The perpetuation of an ascribed organizational type is often ensured 
through the rules of operation, established control mechanisms and entrenched 
hierarchies (Knudsen, 1995; Suddaby, et al., 2010). These observations support the 
theoretical basis of the dissertation in that institutionalized organizations represent sub-
institutions or archetypes that are persistent and identifiable. A deeper examination of 
organizational archetypes is presented in the following section.  
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Organizational Archetypes 
Organizational archetypes are specific groups of formal and informal collective 
actions, rules and structures, which are monitored and regulated (Ferguson & Ketchen, 
1999; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; Reed, 2001). This dissertation argues that the existence of 
embedded coercive institutional and bureaucratic influences that exist within 
organizations to sustain and promote the institutionalism of the firm have significant 
effects on leaders from different organizational archetypes (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kraatz 
& Block, 2008; Mintzberg, 1979).  
Change is understood in archetype theory as involving processes of interpretive 
de-coupling and re-coupling of movements within and between archetypes (Kirkpatrick 
& Ackroyd, 2003). The use of archetypes that are subject to similar and dissimilar 
governance mechanisms is appropriate to measure the dynamics of organizational change 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Neo-institutional theory is the selected literature to 
determine if the acquired firms’ organizationally embedded pre-acquisition, decision-
making control mechanisms have an effect upon integration success of an acquired firm.  
It is not uncommon for the terms mergers and acquisitions to be applied 
interchangeably when referring to the joining of two separate business entities (Mehta & 
Hirschheim, 2004). Technical differences however, maybe important in some cases. 
Acquisitions typically refer to the purchase of one firm by another firm, whereas a 
merger is considered an agreement between two or more companies to combine into one 
organization (Raquib, Musif, & Mohamed, 2003a). Despite such technical differences, 
management studies often do not make such distinctions when evaluating the effects of 
combining two organizations because the distinction between mergers and acquisitions in 
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organizational practice is principally only a legal definition (Van Knippenberg, Van 
Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002). Mergers are often promoted as the combining 
of two equals to the employees and stakeholders impacted by the activity; however, from 
a psychological perspective, mergers generally take on the characteristics of a takeover 
by one entity or the other (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991; Van 
Knippenberg, et al., 2002). In the event of a merger of equals, fights for organizational 
and cultural control will likely ensue (Bower, 2001). Regardless of positioning, theories 
of organizational dominance suggests that there will always be a stronger or more 
authoritarian entity in every duopoly (Panchal & Cartwright, 2001; Van Knippenberg, et 
al., 2002). Even in the merger of equals, there is a cultural dominator, and it is common 
to expect social, cultural, institutional, and governmental differences to interfere with 
integration (Bower, 2001; Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis III, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, van 
Laar, & Levin, 2004). Based on these observations, the terms merger and acquisition are 
used interchangeably throughout this document and will refer to the change of structural 
control based on an agreed-to exchange of value. 
To provide a behavioral foundation for the neo-institutional framework of this 
proposal, a summary of non-institutionally based merger and acquisition literatures is 
presented next. The summary highlights key concepts that might be considered 
antecedents to leader behavior when encountering changes within the embedded 
organizational institutionally specific control mechanisms. The interpretations make 
important contributions toward understanding the multifaceted and inter-reliant impact of 
perceived autonomy on merged and assimilated organizations and help to establish a 
platform from which individual response to change will be viewed through a neo-
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institutional perspective. It is important to introduce these literatures early in the literature 
review to demonstrate how exposure to organizational change can affect acquired leaders 
and link perceived levels of autonomy, or autonomy change when the rules of the 
organization are changed through acquisition or assimilation. Accordingly, part of the 
literature review already highlights the link to institutional and neo-institutional theory, 
which is discussed after this subsequent section. The review of this literature is 
summarized in Appendix I. 
Relevant Behavioral and Economic Literatures 
Extant research has demonstrated how the impression of external control over 
personal situations can affect individuals’ sense of commitment (Bacon & Hoque, 2005), 
self-efficacy (Ajzen, 2002; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Kowal & Fortier, 1999; Mael 
& Ashforth, 1995), and effective leadership (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Waldman, 
Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001). A behavioral response is compelled when change is 
forced upon individuals (Greenberg, 1987; Hall & Mansfield, 1971).  
Organizations are recognized as institutional mechanisms, which hold and retain 
power to promote survival of the structure (Scott, 2008b; Stinchcombe, 1968). 
Institutional perspectives are important to understand the effects of power and control 
change in organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Institutions are legitimized and 
characterized by shared normative frameworks. Individuals are expected to adopt 
organizational value proposition and maintenance mechanisms as a condition of 
membership. Such a commitment is not just implied, but imposed on members of the 
organization, willingly or unwillingly (Scott, 2008b; Simon, 1997). Acquired members 
must make a conscious shift by adapting to organizational values, mechanisms and 
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traditions of the organization. Alteration of decision-making authority may have 
significant and unsettling effect on acquired management (Lewin, 1951). A change in 
organizational context redefines the normative structures familiar to the employee and 
may affect decision choice. Another impediment is the power of new organizational 
positions and the changing status of individual organizational members (Zucker, 1983). 
Changes of control within an organization can disrupt the individual automatic response 
to situational choice and may be intensified when organizations merge or must adapt to 
new controls and processes (Scott, 2008b). Such consequences are particularly germane 
to retained leaders of acquired organizations. 
Transfer and integration of new practices requires the release of one set of values, 
processes and experiential learnings with the acceptance of new procedures, controls and 
institutions of the acquiring firm. Integration processes may disrupt the flow of economic 
decision-making and create disruption in the organization since it is no longer 
accomplished automatically or by way of established routines (Krasner, 1988; Nelson & 
Winter, 1995). 
  Employees identify with their organization to the extent that they see an overlap 
between the identity of the organization and their individual identity (Foreman & 
Whetten, 2002; Meyer, 2001). A core principle of social identity theory is that individuals 
generally view themselves as extensions of the groups in which they are a part of and 
particularly when an individual is a key member of that group (Dyer Jr & Whetten, 
2006). When individuals or groups experience change, they may react proactively or 
defensively (Cameron, 2008). Change evokes emotional resistance that may result in a 
threat to self-image and significant discomfort (Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001). 
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Individual and group feelings of defeat and unwilling assimilation may occur during 
transfer of ownership whether a merger occurs in related or unrelated organizations 
(Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Swanson & Power, 2001; Zaheer, Schomaker, & 
Genc, 2003). The merging of groups typically requires significant adjustment and 
accommodation among the acquired individuals (Amiot, Terry, Jimmieson, & Callan, 
2006). Meyer and Rowan (1977) criticized what they referred to as “prevailing” 
economic theories which assume that control of activity and authority are the critical 
dimensions on which formal organizations have succeeded. Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
later conceded that the essence of a bureaucratic organization lies in the impersonal 
character of structural controls.  
The entrenchment of power and control mechanisms requires the acculturation 
and adaptation of new members to be successful (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990). 
Individuals faced with adjusting to new organizations are subject to political pressures 
and underlying power distributions that protect the existing institutions of the dominant 
organizations (Scott, 2008b).  
Re-socialization and acculturation are unavoidable when separate operating 
communities are aggregated as one (Carroll & Richard Harrison, 2002; Weber & 
Camerer, 2003). Groups rely on leaders to direct and guide the socio-political and 
operational practices (Bass, 1990; DiGeorgio, 2001; Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006; Schraeder 
& Self, 2003). A feeling of belonging to a specific organization can become displaced 
during assimilation into new organizations and therefore the individual must reorient to 
the new institutional organizational values, practices and methods of controlling 
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economic interests. Perceived problems in performance may arise from functional, 
political and social organizational changes (Oliver, 1992). 
Coercive means of enforcing institutional change, be it regulatory coercion or 
organizational coercion, can create pushback from the embedded cognitive responses of 
the affected employee that may lead to disruption and uncertainty (Fligstein, 2001). 
“Indeed, it is the interaction of the cost of transacting with the distribution of coercive 
power that shapes the development of institutions” (North, 1986, p. 233).  
Organizational controls within institutionalized firms are compelled to ritual 
conformity, from both internal and external sources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The 
consistent operation of an organization is managed through coercive application of 
institutionalized check and balance systems which exist within its structures (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). Organizations and institutions may constrain or empower behavior. 
Organizations by their nature, emerge to control and dispense power through rules, 
regulations, checks and balances; they are enforced by the bureaucratic structure of the 
body itself. The coercive function of organizational bureaucracy is accentuated in 
mergers and acquisitions because it exists primarily to limit and control individual 
autonomy (Adler & Borys, 1996). Changes of control within an organization have been 
demonstrated to disrupt the automatic response of actors affected (Krasner, 1988). This 
can easily be the case when organizations merge or must adapt to new organizational 
controls and processes. The next section discusses potential behavioral reactions to 
organizational change and individual response to changes in organizational behavior. 
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Behavioral and Economic Choice Inferences 
The behavioral and economic-choice synopsis of literatures associated with 
merger and acquisition illuminate potential effects of human behavior under 
organizational change. The brief overview demonstrates how organizations are humanly 
concocted systems containing constraints that structure the political, economic and social 
interactions of employees (North, 1990). Organizations are comprised of both formal and 
informal codes of conduct. The success of the organization is dependent upon human 
cooperation within a particular system (North, 1990; Olson, 1965). The formal decision-
making constraints are specified and enforced by political institutions within the 
particular organization. Formations of human behavior are the product of rational choice 
theory (North, 1990). The motivation of personnel is more complicated and their 
preferences less constant than traditional economic theory of organizations might suggest 
(Hatch, 2010; Schein, 2010). Less understood are the assumptions that all employees 
have the cognitive and emotional presence to respond to organizational controls and 
systems, which produce the economic outcome anticipated by the organizational structure 
(North, 1990). The literature further demonstrates that human behavior is affected by the 
individual’s perceived ability to interact within the matrix of stature and choice with 
personal confidence and satisfaction (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, & Millet, 
2007; Clark, Gioia, Ketchen Jr, & Thomas, 2010; Datta, 1991; Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993; Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1999; Very, Lubatkin, 
Calori, & Veiga, 1997). It is not difficult to consider the potential for disparate human 
interaction (temporary or permanent) within incompatible or simply different 
organizational protocol based on the aforementioned literatures. To test this potential, the 
29 
 
 
 
study relies on a neo-institutional paradigm of organizational institutionalism, which 
seeks to isolate demonstrable characteristics unique to commonly structured 
organizational archetypes. Table 6 in Appendix I provides additional synthesized reviews 
of literatures associated with post-acquisition impact on acquired leaders. The remainder 
of this section examines the origins of neo-institutional thought and discusses how the 
neo-institutional perspective applies to organizational archetypes. 
Core Theoretical Literatures: Institutional and Neo-Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has become the dominant macro-perspective on organizational 
development (Suddaby, 2010; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Wooten, 2008). Institutional 
theory supports a platform to explain the outcomes of environmental pressures that shape 
trades, industries and conventions (Scott, 2008a; Zucker, 1983, 1988a). The concept of 
external pressures regulating or limiting choice is the seed for development and 
perpetuation of the institutions, which are a result of natural or created external forces 
(Oliver, 1991). The neo-institutional concept facilitates a more granular perspective from 
which theorists may study the influences of actors inside an organization on the 
development, evolution and personality of a particular firm within the rational choice 
boundaries of the macro environment (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006). 
Neo-institutional perspectives help to explain individual organizational culture and 
cultural differences within institutional boundaries (Dobbin, 1994; Pedersen & Dobbin, 
2006). The following review of institutional and neo-institutional literatures within a 
historical and interspersed context demonstrates the similarities, nuances and 
transformations of institutional and neo-institutional theory.  
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Early institutionalism recognized that behavior was governed by habit and 
convention (Dacin, et al., 2002; Scott, 1987, 2008a). “Not only is the individual’s 
conduct edged about and directed by his habitual relations to his fellows in the group, but 
these relations, being of an institutional character, vary as the institutional scene varies 
[sic]” (Veblen, 1909, p. 245). Neo-institutional perspectives emerged to help understand 
the patterns of power and control in organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Neo-
institutional theory plays an important role for the study of organizational change 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2008b). The dependency upon human interaction 
provides support for the development of institutional boundaries and the recognition of 
distinct institutional and organizational behavior (Commons, 1921; Veblen, 1898). 
Commons (1924) suggested that that the exertion of power in an organization is two or 
more ambitions competing, persuading, and coercing within an existing environment of 
rules of conduct and limited bounds of behavior that are governed by the institution. 
Subsequent reviews of Commons’ (1924) work further developed the concept of 
institutionalized organizations and concluded that institutions are simply organizational 
solutions that consist of a set of rights and duties and authority for enforcing them (Van 
de Ven, 1993). 
Stemming from works of Philip Selznick in the 1940s, institutional theory began 
to take greater traction among organizational scholars (Selznick, 1948). Selznick 
recognized the tension between relational needs and commitment requirements of actors 
within an organization. The inherent strain of a formal organization to ensure consistent 
actions along common missions could conflict with the individual need for self-efficacy 
and self-determination. This individualistic tendency is based on Freudian concepts of 
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man as an individually motivated organism stimulated a view of organizations as 
cooperative institutions (Selznick, 1948).  
Cooperative firms must measure the formal controls over individuals while 
providing managers sufficient authority to meet their innate needs and contribute in a 
willing, motivated and cooperative manner (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Selznick, 
1948). Cooperative organizations are dependent upon stability (Clark, et al., 2010; 
Hamilton, 2010). The introduction of new elements, such as new organizations, can upset 
the stability or equilibrium of an existing institution and its power base (Bellinger & 
Hillman, 2000; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). The fear of that destabilization 
could lead to authoritative controls and formal measures over the potentially destabilizing 
entity (Selznick, 1948). From such foundational constructs and the contributions of 
organizational pioneers such as Merton (1938), Davis and Moore (1945) and Weber 
(1946, 1947), emerged the neo-institutionalism of DiMaggio and Powell (1983). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduced the proposition of institutional 
isomorphism. Institutional theory of the firm suggests the sociology of organizations is 
necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between governance practices 
and hierarchies and to understand how the form is sustained in the organization (Cohen, 
et al., 2008). Institutional isomorphism is of particular relevance to firms developing new 
organizations whether internally developed, merged or acquired. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) described such use of isomorphism as a constraining process that controls 
behavioral actions under common environmental conditions. The concept of constraining 
forces however goes much further. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assigned three 
typologies of isomorphism to their neo-institutional theory. The relationship of economic 
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transactions within rules or processes that affect individuals and contribute to the 
development of organizational culture, practices, and success is often found to be of 
particular interest of neo-institutional studies (Scott, 2010). The contemplation of 
isomorphic pressures on organizational development is germane to the dissertation to 
support how organizational archetypes develop and preserve their character and how 
individuals respond within a given archetype (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004).  
Institutional isomorphism is anchored in the concept that organizations compete 
for not only resources and markets, but also political power and legitimacy. The 
isomorphic pressures encountered by an organization can lead to governance practices 
that provide legitimacy or reduce uncertainty over improving performance (Beckert, 
2010).  
The first of the isomorphic typology is coercive isomorphism, which stems from 
political, regulatory or control mechanisms that influence the universe of decision choice. 
Coercive isomorphism is generally understood to originate from outside sources such as 
governmental or regulatory edicts. Organizational institutions may be interpreted as 
structures controlled by those holding power with rules established to protect and retain 
their power (Stinchcombe, 1968). The organization also will have embedded mechanisms 
utilized by management of the organization to retain that power and assert power over 
others (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Early institutional researchers recognized the significance 
of organizational control on institutional levels even through coercive dictums of the 
organization (Dacin, et al., 2002; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Luoma & Goodstein, 
1999; Parsons, Bales, & Shils, 1953; Scott, 2008b; Stinchcombe, 1968).  
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The second is mimetic isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that 
mimetic isomorphism emulates from responses to uncertainty. Mimetic isomorphism is 
often applied to organizations that enter new markets unfamiliar to the experience or 
resource base of the existing institution. By adopting the structure, processes and 
strategies of the market leaders, the uncertainties are mitigated.  
Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization of the organization. 
Professionalization refers to the adoption of best practices found in that industry or 
market. These practices stem from commonalities of professional standards, education or 
regulatory controls. Such normative environments might be expected to transcend 
organizational nuances, particularly in related industries and therefore should pose little 
concern for integration of related acquisitions (Datta & Grant, 1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
Among the neo-institutional isomorphic pressures, the effects of coercive 
isomorphic practices in particular, can have significant effect on performance (Heugens 
& Lander, 2009). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined coercive pressure as conformist 
forces on an organization emanating from other organizations upon which it depends for 
critical resources or from institutions upholding the cultural expectations of the 
organization in which it operates. These coercive pressures exist both internally as well as 
externally (Zucker, 1983). Coercive isomorphism is driven by pressures from external 
institutions on which a focal organization is dependent and an organization's internal 
pressure to conform to the operational expectations of the owners (Brannen & Peterson, 
2008; Sitkin & Pablo, 2005). Coercive isomorphism, therefore, is analogous to 
constructions of a resource dependence model view in that organizations are viewed as 
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constrained by those on whom they depend for resources (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). Institutionalized organizations attempts to control and coordinate 
integration activities can lead to individual separation from the implementation process 
and result in excessive attention toward establishing personal power and autonomy 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such constraints in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory 
include pressures to bring an organization's structure in line with the demands of those 
who already hold the power and can be particularly obstructive during post-acquisition 
integration (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Neo-institutional theory explains how embedded 
organizational controls maintain the character of a firm or firm type (Suddaby, 2010; 
Suddaby, et al., 2010; Zucker, 1977).  
Neo-institutional studies often examine how an agent is managed or controlled by 
the institution to further the institutional and organizational values (Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos, 2000; Scott, 2008b). The perpetuation of institutional boundaries are 
supported, adhered to and evolve through active learning (Knudsen, 1995). Neo-
institutionalism suggests that economic transactions within rules and processes affect 
individuals and contribute to the development of organizational culture and practices 
(Dobbin, 1994; Langlois, 1989; North, 1986). Within a neo-institutional framework, 
organizations can be reasoned to capture gains arising from specialization and division of 
labor (Scott, 2008a, 2008b). Newly acquired individuals, such as those brought in 
through merger or acquisition, may accept rank and duty voluntarily or through coercive 
pressures (Kraatz & Block, 2008; North, 1986).  
Central to the proposition that acquired firms are subject to influences of 
archetypical institutions, the potential for coercive isomorphism leveled by the acquiring 
35 
 
 
 
firm during assimilation could be reflected through autonomy allowed to the acquired or 
new entity (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Pinnington & Morris, 2002; Vosselman, 2002). 
When organizational assimilation or integration occurs, subjection to the dominant 
standard practice is likely (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 
1988; Ranft, Butler, & Sexton, 2011). Enforcement of the acquirer’s modus operandi and 
best practices may be forced upon the newly acquired firm (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Nikandrou, Papalexandris, & Bourantas, 2000). Those 
exercises might differ from the historic practices of the acquired operation (Nikandrou, et 
al., 2000; Pinnington & Morris, 2002). Governance reconfigurations during acquisition 
integration center on the allocation of decision-making and autonomy authority (Fogarty 
& Dirsmith, 2001). Perception of coercive isomorphism may also manifest itself in the 
division of labor and allocation of decision-making power that can be manipulated by the 
assignment of roles or authority (Dannefer, 1984).  
Deci and Ryan (1987) described the more positive effect allocation of autonomy 
has on motivation, trust and cognitive flexibility over external control. Much of the 
behavioral study regarding locus of control, relative standing and upper echelons 
discussed in earlier sections have dealt with the intrinsic motivation of individuals and 
their perceived degree of self-efficacy. Considering the assimilation of new groups, self-
efficacy and motivation much more influence on individual choice and behavioral 
outcomes (Ajzen, 2002; Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993; Rotter, 1966; Very, et al., 1997). 
Deci and Ryan (1987).These concepts are supported by the behavioral literature 
regarding human effects of merger and acquisition integration processes. It has been 
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demonstrated that the impact of internal and external organizational forces influence 
behavior and affect performance.  
Merger and acquisition could be considered a reflection of institutional change. 
The coordination and control of structure is the critical dimensions on which formal 
organizations succeed and continue. This point is reinforced by Meyer and Rowan (1977, 
p. 342) through the statement that, “The essence of a modern bureaucratic organization 
lies in the rationalized and impersonal character of structural elements and of the goals 
that link them”. Individuals faced with adjusting to new organization are often subject to 
deeply embedded political mechanisms, which promote the underlying distribution of 
power and reinforce the existing institution (Scott, 2008b). Re-socialization and 
acculturation are unavoidable when separate operating communities are aggregated into a 
single entity (Carroll & Richard Harrison, 2002; Weber & Camerer, 2003). A member’s 
sense of belonging can be obfuscated and require reorientation to the new institutional 
organizational values, practices and methods of controlling economic interests when 
organizations are merged or assimilated. Groups rely on leaders to direct and guide the 
socio-political and operational practices and hierarchies (Bass, 1990; DiGeorgio, 2001; 
Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006; Schraeder & Self, 2003). Perceived problems in performance 
may arise from functional, political and social organizational changes (Oliver, 1992). 
Neo-institutional theory connects microelements of cognitive reinforcements that 
are both voluntary and involuntary but hold fast to residuals of automatic response (Scott, 
2008b). To manipulate or change the foundations created and employed by institutional 
distinctions takes time, method, manipulation and even coercion (Hirsch, 1997; Scott, 
2008b). Coercive means of enforcing institutional change, be it regulatory coercion or 
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organizational coercion may create a pushback from the embedded cognitive responses 
leading to disruption and uncertainty (Fligstein, 2001). The uniform operation of an 
institutional organization is managed through coercive application of institutionalized 
control systems (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Kraatz & Block, 2008). It is the effectiveness 
of coercive power that shapes the development of institutions and organizations (North, 
1986). Organizational structures and processes are dedicated to ritual conformity (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977).  
Accepting that organizations contain embedded infrastructures that are 
institutionalized within the organization, adapting to new organizations can become 
troublesome for groups and individuals, particularly in the occasion of large scale and 
abrupt change. The next section more specifically reflects the application of a neo-
institutional perspective regarding embedded characteristics of organizations and the 
complications, which arise with institutional and organizational change resultant of 
mergers and acquisition. 
Neo-institutional Adaptation and Integration 
Leveraging the literatures of Zucker (1983, 1987, 1988b) and Oliver (1992), the 
neo-institutional concept of de-institutionalization can be associated with the assimilation 
of an acquired organization into a new organization. Considering the mechanisms of 
institutional form on individual organizations, the de-commissioning of one organization 
and rebuilding of it within another organization has similar pressures (Oliver, 1992). 
Functional, political and social concerns arise from perceived problems in performance 
associated with organizational changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). A retained employee 
of an acquired firm, hereafter referred to as an acquired employee, must re-orient to the 
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new organization’s institutionalized values, practices and methods of controlling 
economic interests. Individuals faced with adjusting to new organizations are subject to 
political pressures and underlying power reinforces the existing institutional 
arrangements (Cartwright & Cooper, 2005; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988). Although institutions represent continuity and persistence within 
their individual organization, newcomers must learn to adapt to be a successful member 
of the new organization (Scott, 2008b).  
Autonomy is both desirable and critical during the integration of acquired firms 
(Appelbaum, Gandell, Shapiro, Belisle, & Hoeven, 2000; Datta, Grant, & Rajagopalan, 
1991; Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Essential for an investigation of post-acquisition 
autonomy is the recognition of intended degree of integration. Level of organizational 
integration is defined as the degree of post-acquisition change in an organization’s 
administrative, operational and cultural structures (Pablo, 1994). Not all firms are 
acquired with full integration as a strategic objective (Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000). 
Firms that are acquired for diversification strategies may not be integrated as thoroughly 
as tactical acquisitions such as acquisitions made for supply, capacity or market control 
initiatives (Pablo, 1994; Singh & Zollo, 1998). The degree of integration is also 
dependent upon values assessed upon human capital and organizational relationships of 
the target firm during the due-diligence stage (Coff, 2002; Harding & Rouse, 2007). The 
degree of integration is important to successful acquisitions (Whitaker, 2012). High 
levels of integration may theoretically enhance synergistic potential, but it can also result 
in negative outcomes in the form of increased coordination costs and/or inter-
organizational conflicts (Pablo, 1994). 
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Firms are acquired for many different reasons, including new market penetration, 
capacity expansion, diversification, access to technology and even opportunism (Napier, 
2007; Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). Research has shown that the buying firm rarely 
allows the acquired top management team full autonomy, especially when the motivation 
to acquire originated from the belief that new management can better utilize the acquired 
firm's physical and human capital (Lubatkin, et al., 1999). Datta and Grant  (Datta & 
Grant, 1990) measured acquired firm autonomy and performance results in related and 
unrelated acquisitions. Their conclusions acknowledged the importance of post-merger 
autonomy under degree of firm relatedness. Findings indicated that unrelated acquired 
firms received greater decision-making authority than firms acquired in industries or 
processes familiar to the acquirer. Datta and Grant (1990) also concluded that firms 
wishing to integrate or expand a familiar process into existing operations are more likely 
to merge the acquired business and its processes into the existing institutional structure 
under preexisting control and decision mechanisms.  
Firms acquiring unfamiliar processes or market positions will rely on the acquired 
institutional structure by allowing greater autonomy and decision-making authority of the 
management team (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). The success of post-acquisition 
integration depends on managerial action exercised and communicated during the process 
(Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). Even considering a methodical, integrative process, local 
activities are managed in an interdependent way. The integration approach and execution 
of integration activities require local management and decisions (Birkinshaw, Bresman, 
& Håkanson, 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Contrary to this view, Faulkner, Child 
and Pitkethly (2003) suggested that even in traumatic integration events in which the 
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acquired firm feared losing its identity and autonomy, that fear was eventually overcome. 
This may not be the case when firms acquire to expand their organizational knowledge. 
The acquisition of human capital is frequently a strategic aim of the acquisition; however, 
in the face of loss of autonomy, talent often leaves (Krug & Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, et 
al., 1999; Siehl & Smith, 1990). Additional studies have indicated the rate of 
entrepreneurial innovation declines post-acquisition when autonomy is removed 
(Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006). The most important qualifier for level of 
integrations is how capable the existing resources are in the management of the acquired 
company (Wernerfelt, 1984). If the acquisition was undertaken for plant, property and 
equipment and not the softer side of a firm such as people, relationships and creativity, 
the firms are likely to experience a greater degree of integration and, therefore, less 
decision-making autonomy (Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000).  
Acquisitions made to diversify risk are commonly decentralized and allowed 
greater autonomy to run and manage the operations (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; 
Zaheer, Castañer, & Souder, 2011). Firms acquired outside the acquiring firm’s 
knowledge base are typically allowed more autonomy (Datta, 1991; Datta, et al., 1991; 
Datta & Grant, 1990). Because this study is intended to assess the acquired firm 
perspective, the acquiring firms planned strategy is difficult to identify with certainty. 
Managements’ perceived degree of post-acquisition decision-making authority does 
however; infer the acquirer’s evaluation of human capital through identifying the 
retention of acquired talent. The perceptions of individual autonomy are the mechanisms 
influencing success in post-acquisition integration (Colman, 2008; Graebner, 2004; 
Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). The possibility that perception of integration success 
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could be negatively associated with higher levels of autonomy may none-the-less, exist 
(Ranft, et al., 2011). Extant research however, overwhelmingly extols the inferences of a 
positive relationship between local decision-making authority and integration regardless 
of the level of prescribed integration or relatedness of the acquisition (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Zaheer, et al., 2011). The review and interpretation of literatures to this 
point has highlighted the effect integrations and the rigidness of organizational practice, 
particularly internal coercive enforcement of embedded rules, can have on individuals 
and groups. The next section consolidates and reduces the findings into an integrated set 
of hypotheses, which emerged from those literatures. 
Hypotheses 
Successful post-acquisition integration is significantly dependent upon the 
acquiring and acquired firm leadership (Gadiesh, Buchanan, Daniell, & Ormiston, 2002). 
It is not uncommon for pre-acquisition leaders to be retained during a transition period to 
support the specific business and interpersonal relationships acquired by the new firm 
(Graebner, 2004). The perceived capabilities of the acquired management team have 
great bearing upon the level of autonomy and freedom of decision-making power allowed 
to the acquired leaders (Walsh, 1989). Situations where pre-acquisition diligence has 
identified leadership issues with the target company may base the acquisition opportunity 
in upgrading or changing management (Harding & Rouse, 2007; Hellmann, 1998; 
Hellmann & Puri, 2002). In situations where the opportunity to extract greater rents from 
an underperforming operation may be considered a result of weak management, those 
managers are not likely to be retained (Antila, 2006; Siehl & Smith, 1990). The pre-
acquisition human capital evaluation is invariably an element of autonomy and decision-
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making allocation for those preserved (Bertoncelj & Kovač, 2007; Harding & Rouse, 
2007; Teerikangas, 2012). 
 Firms deemed underperforming despite adequate financial and material resources 
are typically acquired with the specific objective to enhance the management of the target 
operation (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Manne, 1965). In the most severe situations, 
leadership is not retained; however, in moderate circumstances the leadership is retained 
during a transitional period to facilitate the change of management, accommodate 
relationship transfers, and provide unique and specific insights for a new operating team 
(Bergh, 2001; Manne, 1965).  
Not all leaders of the acquired teams agree to remain under new management 
(Siehl & Smith, 1990; Walsh, 1988). A retained leaders’ inability to adjust to new control 
mechanisms, strategies or organizational dictums can result in an involuntary change of 
leadership (Bordia, Hunt, Paulsen, Tourish, & DiFonzo, 2004). Some instances of 
choosing not to retain leadership teams at acquisition can be symbolic to signify a change 
of control in decision-making authority within the acquired firm (Pfeffer, 1981; Walsh & 
Ellwood, 1991). Alternatives to retaining embedded acquired firm leadership include 
parent company assignment of internal candidates (Cannella Jr & Hambrick, 1993), 
hiring outside leaders (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005), or replacing pre-acquisition leadership 
with other acquired firm candidates (Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997; Shimizu & Hitt, 
2005). 
The appearance of forced assimilation may also have detrimental effect on 
integration and performance (Bacon & Hoque, 2005; Liang, Saraf, Hu, & Xue, 2007). 
The integration processes may be viewed by those assimilated as coercive due to the 
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conveyances of new institutional and organizational practices (Auster & Sirower, 2002; 
Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008). To overcome the appearance of a coercive take-over, 
the acquired leader is often retained in some form to facilitate a transition. The argument 
in favor of keeping an acquired leader/manager is typically supported by a desire to 
maintain the market and organizational relationships the acquired firm has built upon 
(Krug, 2003). Preserving relationships depends upon the decision-making authority of 
local leaders. Despite the best intentions of acquiring leaders, a change in authoritative 
hierarchy may be imposed by the new organizations’ embedded control mechanisms, 
which may appear coercive or demonstrative to the acquired leadership. Citing earlier 
studies along these lines, Puranam (2006, p. 7) remarked “Even if they [acquired 
management] are retained via highly powered incentive systems, lowered intrinsic 
motivation due to lowered task autonomy following structural integration can lead to 
similar [lower performance] results”.  
Effective leaders manage transitions with greater comfort when their self-efficacy, 
locus of control and relative standing continue to meet their individual needs (Joslin, 
Waters, & Dudgeon, 2010; Kim, Lee, & Carlson, 2010). When personal socio-
psychological needs are not met, a leader may become resistant or uncooperative 
(Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Risberg, 2001). The discomfort exhibited by the 
leader is sometimes reflected upon the group with negative ramifications upon the 
transition and group assimilation (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004).  
 Successful mergers and acquisitions are highly dependent upon integration 
transitions (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999). Established leaders 
who enjoy significant autonomy and decision-making power in their current positions 
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develop a comfort in their role (Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Strategic decisions are 
based on prior experiences and rational evaluation, which reinforces the security of those 
decisions and the confidence to make them (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). A change in 
an unfamiliar direction and inability to execute on those experiences can have detrimental 
effect on the leader’s sense of control, and relative standing among peers and 
subordinates (Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Kormanik & Rocco, 2009; Shivers-
Blackwell, 2006; Wageman, 1995). The effects could result in negative impact for 
cooperation, influencing leadership and followers.  
Bureaucracies inherent in institutionalized organizations are measured by the 
degree of formalization applied to authority allocation (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008). Authority is both arbitrary and legitimized (Suchman, 1995). The influence 
of organizational controls for the execution of power and decision-making authority are 
defined through the rules, regulations and processes maintained by the formal 
institutionalized organization and are enforced through behavioral compliance 
(Commons, 1931). Coercion is a driver of compliance albeit not the only motivation for 
compliance, it is a significant and ever present force (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Hirsch, 
1997; Sutinen & Kuperan, 1999). Exposure to forced transitions or coercive acculturation 
by the acquiring (dominant firm) may intensify perceived loss of power, deepen 
resistance to assimilation by the leaders and/or work groups (Auster & Sirower, 2002; 
Datta, 1991; Judge, et al., 2008). Integration success and output performance could 
therefore be negatively affected. Coercive isomorphism within institutional change 
theoretically explains the potential trickle-down effect of the leaders’ perceived impact to 
self and group when autonomy and decision-making authority changes. The perception of 
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coercion in concert with loss of autonomy often accompanies integration. Dominant 
coercive institutional forces were described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) as 
resulting from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations. The impacts 
of apparent coercion can range from a perceived dominance to extreme and overt 
occurrences (Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Acknowledging the potential obstacle a 
loss of perceived autonomy in a post-merger organization among acquired firm leaders, 
stratified subunits or groups may have on the assimilation or reorientation toward new 
owners, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: Higher perceived levels of post-acquisition autonomy by the acquired firm leaders 
will be positively associated with perceived post-acquisition integration success. 
 
Supporting a neo-institutional perspective, the ensuing discussion makes the case 
for publically traded, professionally managed privately held and founder owned and 
operated organizational archetypes as micro-institutions in and of themselves. The 
dissertation proposes that differentiation between organizational governance, formats, 
mechanisms, processes, and decision-making allocations are sufficiently distinctive to be 
considered institutionalized within the individual organization and exacerbate disruption 
when transfers from one archetype to another are forced (Bachmann, 2001; Hasselbladh 
& Kallinikos, 2000).  
Mechanism logics provide a practical perspective to explore institutional 
conformity among archetypical business types such as public for-profit, professionally 
managed privately held and founder owned and operated firms. “While power and 
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politics are present in all organizations, the sources of power, its meaning, and its 
consequences are contingent on higher-order institutional logics” (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999, p. 802). Institutional logics are defined as the formal and informal rules by which 
executive power is managed or lost within organizations. Such logics, which appear in all 
organizations, may be more alike in some types of businesses than others are and hold a 
unique codification based on their organizational type (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Suddaby, et al., 2010). This dissertation investigates effects of 
generalized business types to determine if the commonalities are discernible and produce 
like-effect in a merger and acquisition integration event.  
  It is important to use a moderately granular definition of these archetypes to 
demonstrate the macro-categorization of the institutions they represent through common 
structuration of such institutions (Giddens, 1984; Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). There 
are many and varied definitions of a public company. Public companies often refer to 
publicly traded for-profit firms or government entities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Perry & 
Rainey, 1988). For purposes of this study, the concern is with for-profit non-
governmental limited liability organizations therefore, the following definition is applied 
to the term “public company” as described in the Model Business Corporation Act of The 
American Bar Association (2011). A U.S. publicly traded company is a limited liability 
company that offers company securities including but not limited to; stocks, bonds and 
other equity backed instruments for sale to the public, typically through a security 
exchange and is subject to the rules, regulations and jurisdiction of the Security and 
Exchange Commission (Sale, 2011).  
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  A professionally managed private firm in the U.S. is a non-public firm whose 
ownership is closely held and not available to the public through an open trading 
exchange, is owned by fewer than 500 stockholders and the firm is not required to meet 
the strict Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public companies 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). Professionally 
managed private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares are 
not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, et al., 2005). An example of a professionally 
managed private for-profit company could be typified by the corporate holding of assets 
by a private investor, private investment group or consortium operated by a team of 
professional managers e.g. privately held equity groups or venture capital firms with 
controlling equity of multiple firms (Hellmann, 1998; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). 
Professionally managed private equity and venture capital firms acquire and hold firms 
by means of executing convertible security loan covenants (Bascha & Walz, 2001). 
Bascha and Walz (2001) point out that private equity acquired firms are managed with 
increased parental involvement, and this may result in a significant change in acquired 
firm strategy and control and operate differently from owner-managed and publicly 
traded firms. Privately held, professionally managed equity and venture capital 
investment firms could have a significant degree of family ownership but individual 
assets may not necessarily be directly operated or managed by family owners (Schein, 
1995). Professional managers from larger corporations are very different from founder 
owner-operators (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Professional managers typically hold little 
direct ownership stake in the firm.The distinction is ultimately one of agency 
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responsibilities in distinguishing professional owner operators and professional managers 
(Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Leung, Zhang, Wong, & Foo, 2006). Companies led by 
professional non-owners are more likely to accept multi-authoritative decision-making 
structures than a previously autonomous founder owner-operators (Fligstein, 1985; 
Leung, et al., 2006; Useem & Gottlieb, 2006). 
The founder owned and operated business will represent decision-making 
autonomy of the founder organizational archetype. “Founder – CEOs firms are likely to 
have more influence and decision-making power and thus the impact of differences in 
managerial characteristics on corporate behavior and performance should be particularly 
strong in founder-CEO firms” (Fahlenbrach, 2010, p. 440). There are over 17 million sole 
proprietorships in the U.S., referring to an unincorporated business owned and operated 
by a single person (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007). To support 
such focus, the recent definition depicting CEO owned and operated business of 
(Fahlenbrach, 2010) will be used for the founder owner-operator archetype. Founder 
owner-operator CEOs typically have more organization-specific skills because the 
founder has shaped and managed their organizations from inception; therefore, 
differences in managerial characteristics are particularly strong in founder-owned and 
operated firms (Schein, 1983). Founder-owner operators are also known to have more 
influence and decision-making power than other organizational forms therefore represent 
an ideal organizational archetype for comparison (Fahlenbrach, 2010).  
Founder owner operated firms are typically classified among family business 
groups (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2010; Schein, 1995). It is recognized 
that family owned businesses also fall into the private and public arena. The management 
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characteristics and decision-making freedoms of institutionalized firms are significantly 
influenced by external isomorphic pressures such as security and exchange rules and 
shareholder controls that promote a distinction (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Peng & 
Jiang, 2010). Because such crossovers could portend blurring of archetype boundary 
interpretations, the founder-owner operated business represents a less-fettered way a 
leader-manager could be empowered or constrained by shared normative systems (Scott, 
2008b). Clear distinctions have been identified between the founder owner-operator and 
the professional manager (Schein, 1995). Professional managers are usually identified as 
non-family and as non-owners and typically have less authoritative decision-making 
freedom than owner operators have (Jain & Tabak, 2008; Schein, 1995).  
Within the particular archetypical business structures of public, professionally 
managed private and owner-operated firms, the modes and methods of controls are 
relatively common, making for institutions in and of themselves (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1993, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003). Individuals and organizations are relatively 
stable entities with supporting structures, systems and routines that can be upset in the 
midst of change (Ellis, 2011). This is particularly true of governance mechanisms 
controlling the decision-making authority of leaders and managers (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993). Moves within archetypes might provide familiar levels of autonomy 
control mechanisms. Moves across archetypes may be unfamiliar and require significant 
and possibly disruptive adaptation (Wissema, Van der Pol, & Messer, 1980).  
The nature of publicly traded companies marks agency controls at every level of 
leadership (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Publicly held corporations 
invoke formal levels of control and decision-making approvals. Much of the governance 
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structures of public firms are exogenously imposed by regulators and investors. 
Exogenous sets of governance requirements decreed by the Securities Exchange 
Commission dictate freedoms, install checks and balances and insert oversight that limit 
individual autonomy (Boot, Gopalan, & Thakor, 2006). Private firms, even those with 
greater than 500 owners, have far fewer intrusive controls dictated by outside agencies 
(Boot, et al., 2006; Daily & Dollinger, 1992). Founder owner-operators, by nature of their 
equity stake enjoy individual freedom to manage risk, make decisions and conduct 
business with relatively individual discretion (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fahlenbrach, 
2010). 
It has been demonstrated that leaders of professionally managed privately held or 
founder owned and operated companies typically have far greater autonomy and less 
oversight than those in larger public firms (Miller, et al., 2007; Pieper & Klein, 2007; 
Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2010; 
Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Founder owner-operators generally have significant 
autonomy and decision-making authority (Pieper, 2003; Zellweger, et al., 2010). Owner-
managers exercise virtually autonomous discretion over the use of their firm’s assets 
(Lubatkin, et al., 2005). 
Leaders and professional managers of professionally managed privately owned 
companies may have other owners to answer to and justify actions to, but they also 
frequently enjoy relative freedom to choose and act on their own (Boot, Gopalan, & 
Thakor, 2008). Leaders who have enjoyed great pre-acquisition autonomy are often faced 
with the loss of post-acquisition autonomy when ownership changes (Puranam & 
Srikanth, 2007).  
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It is conceivable that individuals possessing experience with the more 
bureaucratic levels of decision and control could be less affected by a change in 
governance by another corporate institution. One may contend that the more aligned the 
decision-making authority, or decision-making controls are pre and post-acquisition, the 
less affected the acquired leader and acquired group may be to a change in ownership or 
organization. Conversely the less familiar the imposed control system is to the new 
allocation of decision-making controls, the potentially more disruptive the change may be 
on the individual leaders and hence, the group. The disruption may have negative effects 
on the integration success or rate of integration. To investigate these assumptions the 
related hypothesis states:  
 
H2: The relationship between perceived post-acquisition autonomy and post-
acquisition integration success is moderated by the organizational archetype of a firm 
acquired by a public company; specifically, higher levels of perceived success will be 
experienced by leaders of professionally managed private firms than leaders of founder 
owned and operated firms. 
 
Previous experience with organizational integration may provide significant 
lessons learned to all parties involved. The recognition of integration challenges, are 
often learned through experience. Leaders who have recent memory of organizational 
change, merger initiatives and integration processes may be better equipped to manage 
the nuance of organizational change on both an individual and organizational level.  
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Organizational learning refers to the processes of institutionalizing rules, 
practices, routines and conventions of an organization (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
1991). Crossan, Lane and White (1999) described a framework of organizational learning 
as four processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. Learning 
processes are viewed as inter-linked practices at individual, group and organizational 
levels. It involves tensions between the assimilation of new learnings and reinforcement 
of historic learnings (Crossan, et al., 1999). Established learnings are supported through 
the conventions and routines institutionalized within the organization. Routines are 
conveyed through socialization, formal education, imitation, professionalization, 
personnel exchange, and mergers and acquisitions (Levitt & March, 1988). Such 
experiences are acquired through experience within other organizations (Levitt & March, 
1988). 
First-order organizational learnings are routines and processes that serve to 
maintain organizational stability and sustain existing rules (Lant & Mezias, 1992; March, 
1981). Second-order organizational learnings are characterized by the exploration of 
alternative routines, rules, technologies, goals, and improved efficiency. Second-order 
learning emerges from the realization that historical experiences and practices may not be 
applicable to the current situation or organizational structure (Lant & Mezias, 1992; 
Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). 
Organizational learning in merger and acquisition studies takes two distinct 
tracks. One is focused on how experience with assimilation of new groups has a higher 
propensity for success when the participants have greater experience with integration and 
the other is the benefit from incorporating knowledge and experience assets into the 
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acquiring company’s repository (McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008). According to 
McDonald, Westphal and Graebner (2008), the value of experience is recognized and 
dependent upon successful integration in both streams. The importance of retaining that 
knowledge from both acquired management and other firm resources is broadly 
recognized. Human capital resources are an integral element of the resource-based view 
of the firm and contribute greatly to organizational learning (Barney, 1991a; Barney, 
2001a, 2001b; Coff, 2002).  
Acquired business autonomy is recognized by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) to 
facilitate second-order learning in both directions. Their research further demonstrates the 
benefits of extracting the human capital of the acquired firm while the enterprise benefits 
from the additional resources provided by the new owners. Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy 
(2003) emphasize that organizational and behavioral learning is a two way process of 
give and take, but concluded that learning and knowledge-sharing required higher level 
of autonomy, particularly when associated with significant cross-cultural and specific 
localization experience is involved.  
 Organizational learning and experience with integration should also lead to 
recognition of the depth and degree of integration. Pablo (1994) pointed out that 
experienced acquirers would better understand the degree of integration needed and 
therefore will allocate autonomy level better according to need. This concept brings into 
view the perceived human capital of the acquired firm and equates that with the resource 
base already in possession. The greater equipped the purchasing company is with tacit 
knowledge of the firm acquired and the market, the less need for autonomy of the 
acquired firm exists (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992).  
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Another perspective associated with the degree of organizational learning 
perceived as necessary by the acquiring firm, is the opportunity to retain managers. 
Recognition of this parental choice may motivate retained leaders to cooperate regardless 
of how much autonomy is given to the acquired organization. If the acquisition is 
primarily motivated by access to undervalued or underexploited assets, the decision to 
allocate autonomy to acquired human capitol may be nominalized and more complete 
integration may be expected (Zollo & Singh, 2004). To further the concept of effects 
acquired leadership on perceived integration performance, one should consider the 
organizational and experiential learning of the acquired firm leadership team. The 
purpose of structure with an organization is to specify rights and obligations and to 
delineate the steps of the decision process among its agents. Institutionalized structures 
distinguish organizations from one another (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Familiarity with such 
structural decision elements and their outcomes may better prepare acquired leaders for 
the structural organization changes that occur in the transfer from one organizational 
archetype to another.  
Organizational learning is imparted to the organization through individual and 
group experience (Pfeffer, 1983). Firms also gain learnings from the acquisition of new 
employees and retain learnings from employees after their departure. Organizational 
learnings become embedded formally by incorporating learnings into archival data, 
practices, structures and informally through cultural practices promoted and supported by 
members of the firm, consciously or unconsciously (Cohen, 1991; Malone, 2002; Vince, 
2001). Within the context of organizational learning, it is the individual who extracts, 
retains, executes and bases decision-making activities from experiential learnings (Kolb, 
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Boyatzis, & Mainemelis, 2001; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Past experiences may have 
considerable effect on individual choice and individual response to stimuli (Lähteenmäki, 
Toivonen, & Mattila, 2002). It has been argued in organizational learning literatures that 
only individuals learn and impart knowledge and experience to organizational archives 
and collections (Argyris & Schön, 1999; Lähteenmäki, et al., 2002; Shrivastava, 2007) 
These learnings are collected and systemically integrated into the logic of action 
(Thomas, Sussman, & Henderson, 2001).  
 The ability to recall and apply learnings of an acquired firm’s leadership past 
organizational experiences might facilitate an individual’s recognition of situations and 
affect reactions to them. Therefore, it is rational to assume that previous experience with 
mergers and acquisitions could impart significant experiential learnings from both a 
personal level and an organizational level (López, Peón, & Ordás, 2005). Such learnings 
might be leveraged by an acquired firm’s leadership to recognize potential pitfalls during 
the integration process, provide experientially based decision options and enhance the 
success of the integration. It is plausible then, to expect the relationship of perceived 
acquired firm autonomy and integration success to be influenced by former 
organizational learnings of previous M&A experiences (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 
1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985). To avoid weakening of associations and minimize 
temporal interference of recall, a near-term M&A experience is preferred to measure the 
possibility of such influences (Shrivastava, 2007). Near-term M&A experience, thirty six 
months from the event (Capron & Shen, 2007), should be applied to allay recall concerns, 
and remain consistent with other temporal boundaries of perceptual measures as 
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recommended by the literatures. Based on the literatures associated with organizational 
and individual learnings discussed, it is hypothesized that:  
 
H3: The relationship between perceived post-acquisition autonomy and post-
acquisition integration success is moderated by the previous experience with a merger 
or acquisition of the acquired firm’s leadership.  
 
Research Design  
Figure 1 presented below represents the hypothetical main effect relationship of 
post-acquisition autonomy (IV) and integration success (DV). Included are potential 
moderating variables associated with acquired firm ownership and acquired firm 
leadership teams’ recent experience with a merger or acquisition. The acquired firm 
ownership moderation was measured by the type of firm acquired (professionally 
managed private or founder owned and operated) as defined in the methods section. The 
dependent variable was controlled for by previously identified effects relating to relative 
size of the acquired firm, industry relatedness, acquisition experience of acquiring firm, 
retained leader post-acquisition ownership of acquired firm and acquiring firm 
performance. The description and analysis methodology of the proposed model are 
presented in the following chapter.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical model 
  
Summary 
In summary, neo-institutional research has identified institutionalized elements of 
bureaucracy in all organizations (Scott, 2008a, 2008b). Such elements can be the effect of 
internal and external isomorphic forces (Zucker, 1983). The bureaucracy of a particular 
firm will share similar governance mechanisms with comparable organizational models 
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Reed, 2001; Zucker, 1983). Formal control 
mechanisms are implemented through embedded rules of management (Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos, 2000). Mechanisms can be deemed coercive in the sense that they exist to 
reinforce predetermined decision-making authority (Dacin, et al., 2002). When 
individuals are confronted with a change in autonomy, imbedded automatic response 
structures may be disrupted, particularly if subjected to unfamiliar bureaucratic controls 
(Dacin, et al., 2002; Stinchcombe, 1965). Individuals may experience changes to their 
personal socio/psychological sentiments that result in detrimental impacts to the post-
acquisition environment. Effects on acquired leaders may result in disruption, uncertainty 
and turmoil among extended workgroups and impede the integration success. These 
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consequences are representable through measuring leadership transfers within acquired 
organizations. This research evaluates perceived integration performance through 
measuring perceived post-acquisition autonomy of acquired firm leaders. Applying the 
distinct and unique organizational and bureaucratic institutions generally associated with 
public for-profit firms, professionally managed private firms and founder owned and 
operated firms, the perceived change of autonomy and perceived integration success are 
contrasted to determine if a moderating affect exists among institutionally dissimilar 
organizational archetypes. An additional evaluation of acquired firms leaders’ recent 
experience with a merger or acquisition moderates the main effect.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Primary data was obtained from a survey sent to top management team (TMT) 
members of professionally managed privately held and founder owned and operated 
firms that have been acquired by publicly traded U.S. firms within the past 18 - 24 
months from the survey period (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990).  
While leadership literature often focuses primarily on the individual leader, some 
recent research has begun to examine the role of leadership teams as a representation of 
firm leadership (Ensley, Pearson, & Pearce, 2003; Hambrick, 1997). TMT leadership 
represents the united influence, cohesiveness and collective power of leadership teams 
(Ensley, et al., 2003; Jansen, Tempelaar, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). TMT 
characteristics are aggregated influences on firm strategy and decision-making choice 
between members of the TMT (Michalisin, Karau, & Tangpong, 2004; Pearce & Ensley, 
2004). Cohesion is the binding of knowledge and unity of action demonstrated by the 
TMT in response to stimuli and decision choice (Hambrick, 1997; Michalisin, et al., 
2004). Collective vision is the common mental model of organizational strategy and 
culture promoted by the TMT (Colbert, Kristof-Brown, Bradley, & Barrick, 2008; Dess, 
2006). Such characteristics may be uniquely predominant in small to medium enterprises
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 due to the size of the firm and typical size of the top management team (Lubatkin, 
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006). To enhance input opportunity from target SME firms, 
TMT was used as a representation of the leadership team and acted as a proxy for 
leader/leadership effects discussed throughout the dissertation (Hambrick, 1981). The use 
of top management team members, including CEO if available, provides greater 
likelihood of responses to survey requests from target firms and adequately represent 
leadership characteristics in the analysis (Amason, 1996; Melnyk, Page, Wu, & Burns, 
2012). 
Responses from more than one TMT member of the acquired firm were paired 
and averaged whenever possible. Such practice is encouraged by Golden (1992) who 
recommends that firm-specific perceptions may be more reliable when obtained from 
multiple representatives due to temporal recall issues and therefore, sourcing data from 
one or more top management sources avoids “retrospective inaccuracies” (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 2002; Golden, 1992, p. 850). In the event that only one survey is returned 
from the subject firm TMT, the response was included and deemed sufficiently valid for 
analysis; however, it is recognized as a potential limitation of the study (Hambrick, 1981; 
Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). The near period measurement (18 to 24 months) is used to 
mitigate temporal recall issues that could distort responses and allow for a reasonable 
assimilation period (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985; 
Vasilaki & O'Regan, 2008).  
Perceptual measures were used to mitigate the difficulties of accessing pre and 
post-merger data from published corporate reports. Often pre-merger data, especially 
from private companies, are not publicly available (Siegel, Simons, & Lindstrom, 2009). 
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Post-merger financial data regarding acquired subunits are typically incorporated into 
aggregate financial statements of the parent firm (Siegel & Simons, 2010).  
Measurement bias, elevated co-variation and response inflation associated with 
self-reported perceptual measures could be considered a limitation in quantitative 
evaluations (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
The method continues to be widely used in merger and acquisition research (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 2002; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). Subjective performance measures are often 
used in studies of privately held firms where public information is lacking and have been 
shown to correlate with objective performance data in SME firms (Ling & Kellermanns, 
2009; Love, Priem, & Lumpkin, 2002). The perceptual measures methods are equally 
valid in the absence of quantitative data (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers & Nakos, 2004; 
Crampton & Wagner, 1994; Panchal & Cartwright, 2001). Both perceptions of acquired 
firm autonomy and perceptions of post-merger integration success have been previously 
used in merger and acquisition research conducted by Datta (1991), Burgman (1983), 
Kitching (1967), Zaheer et al. (2011), and Weber (1996). “Self-report measures are a 
useful tool to tap conscious experience and empirically measure cognitively relevant 
constructs” (Vinski & Watter, 2012, p. 451). Perceptual outcomes, such as the 
effectiveness of the integration process, are useful in that they provide direct access to the 
impressions and recollections of those actors most affected (Weber, 1996).  
Very et al. (1997) also point out that data drawn from the acquiring firm provides 
little insight into explaining any change in the ability of the acquired business to perform 
as a result of being acquired. Their research highlights the importance of researching 
acquisition phenomena at the business level rather than the corporate level. Grounded in 
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these findings, the data for this study are perceptually based and sourced from the 
acquired firm TMT. 
To maintain a small to medium enterprise focus, the dissertation limits target 
firms to acquired firms employing fewer than 500 workers at time of acquisition, aligned 
with other SME studies (Buckley, 1989; Dickson, Weaver, & Hoy, 2006; Hussinger, 
2010; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). Small and medium sized enterprises are 
not consistently defined in research; they are typically bound by the number of 
employees, fewer than 500 in North America and fewer than 250 in the European Union 
(Ayyagari, Beck, & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Buckley, 1989; OECD, 2012; USITC, 2010). 
European Union definitions additionally cap SMEs with an annual turnover at 85 million 
Euros to qualify as an SME (OECD, 2012) but such a limit was not found to be applied to 
U.S. domestic studies within the literature reviewed. The standard methodology in most 
M&A research places a lower limit on deal value, typically in the range of $10MM to 
$50MM (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009; Schlingemann, 
2004). This dissertation follows suit by placing a lowermost transaction limit of $10MM 
dollar as a foundation. There was no ceiling limitation for the transaction price.  
At the organizational level, hurdles to effectively manage disruptive change are 
higher in larger firms and lower in smaller firms (Moore & Manring, 2009). However, 
making a transition from a small firm to a larger enterprise control and management 
system may show a greater difference in the response to changes in autonomy (Child, 
1973; Datta & Grant, 1990; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). SME organizational structures 
are often simpler than those of larger public firms (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The founder 
owner-operator in particular, is more likely to be directly in control of operational 
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functions and decision-making. The founder owner-operator is also the person who 
develops and carries out visions and controls activities demanding a high need for 
independence and autonomy (Filion, 1990). The need for independence and autonomy 
could be an obstacle to the introduction of integration success factors such as 
participatory management or decision sharing resulting in reduced autonomy and power 
(Pablo, 1994; Schraeder & Self, 2003). As a result, the SME and founder-managers may 
be likely to regard integration with new control management as a threat from loss of 
freedom, the imposition of standards, and risks to pre-acquisition authority (Gelinas & 
Bigras, 2004). The focus on small to medium enterprises provides opportunity to identify 
moderating effects of public, professionally managed private firms or founder owned and 
operated firms on autonomy allocation post-merger. The study therefore produces 
adequate generalizability to other large and small SME businesses within the country of 
study, which is the aim of the research (Brouthers & Nakos, 2004; Dickson, et al., 2006; 
Omerzel & Antoncic, 2008). 
The survey questionnaire contained questions representing four constructs; (1) 
perceived autonomy, (2) perceived integration success, (3) organizational type of pre-
acquisition target and, (4) recent acquisition experience of acquired firm TMT. The 
survey invitations were mailed by post to current leaders and top team managers of the 
acquired company as indicated by most recent information accessed through the Capital 
IQ™ database. Web addresses linking to the survey were included in the invitation letter. 
User codes were provided for firm identification and subject access to survey. Quick 
response codes (QR) were inserted for access to provide hand-held device access to the 
web based surveys (Ashford, 2010; Macer, 2011). The initial invitation mailing was 
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complemented by an identical e-mailed invitation to subjects whose email addresses 
could be identified. The invitation was based on social and professional association and 
opportunity to receive findings with no other tangible incentives offered (Crittenden, 
2011) (additional detail follows this section).  
Challenges to this method may result from leadership and TMT turnover at the 
acquired firm level, lack of interest, insufficient incentive to participate, fear of 
retribution, loss of confidentiality, or the necessity to input the web-address manually. 
Emailed invitations contained automatic links, which is intended to offset issues of web 
address transfer. It is also noted that mature targeted subjects, sixty years of age or older, 
may not be as comfortable using internet or web-based surveys, but this is becoming less 
of an issue in a modern business environment (Hair Jr, Celsi, Money, Samouel, & Page, 
2011).  
To mitigate trust concerns, participant confidentiality was assured in the invitation 
letter and within the survey instructions (Crittenden, 2011). Confidentiality appears to be 
more readily accepted in web-based surveys (Hair Jr, et al., 2011). However, 
confidentiality concerns may be increased due to distrust of electronic media and tracking 
ability fears but are not anticipated to affect response rates (Andrews, Nonnecke, & 
Preece, 2003; Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001). In addition, time demand and ease of 
use of web surveys have been demonstrate to enhance response rates and turnaround time 
over postal mail (paper) surveys requiring physical return of the questionnaire (Andrews, 
et al., 2003; Couper, et al., 2001; Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Sheehan & McMillan, 1999). 
It was anticipated that a complementary mailing, ten to fifteen days after the initial 
mailing enhanced participation (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004). Kaplowitz, 
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Hadlock and Levine (2004) demonstrated response rates of web-based surveys produced 
results comparable to mailed paper surveys.  
According to established standards for quantitative survey research, the minimum 
ratio of observations to variables is five to one, however the preferred ratio is 15 to 20 
observations per construct (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 176). Because the 
model tested has nominal constructs, the target sample size represented a minimum of 20 
returns with a goal of 80 or more usable responses. The number of usable surveys 
exceeded this minimum. Simple regression can be effective with a sample size of 20 
(Hair Jr, et al., 2011), but maintaining power at .80 in multiple regressions requires a 
minimum sample of 50 and preferably, 100 observations (Hair, et al., 2010). Anticipating 
a 10% response rate, the initial survey circulation was distributed to 1,000 potential 
respondents representing 396 unique firms in an attempt to enhance the generalizability 
of the findings by attempting to acquire 100 usable observations.  
Data Source/Sample Identification 
The sample population was derived from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ™ 
(Capital IQ™) database. Capital IQ™ allows cursory search for acquiring firm and 
targets filtered by purchase size, geographic area and transaction close date, which fits 
sample criteria. The initial sample was supplemented with published announcements 
reported in Mergers and Acquisition Magazine, Crain’s List, Bloomberg News, Reuters 
Merger and Acquisitions (Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002). Sample selection was 
limited to U.S. SME firms with fewer than 500 employees and acquired by registered 
U.S. publicly traded firms. A middle market firm (SME) context is supported by 
comments of Very and Schweiger (2001) who determined that decision-making is often 
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more concentrated at the top of smaller companies. The acquirers were publicly listed 
firms identified by Capital IQ™ during the event window. Initial screening included the 
following descriptions: geographic locations of the acquired firms are contained within 
the United States of America; acquired firms have fewer than 500 employees; total 
transaction values of greater than $10M was the minimum limit to avoid non-operating 
exchanges (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009; Schlingemann, 
2004); purchasing companies are registered U.S. public firms, and acquisition close-dates 
were between 18 and 24 months. Deal value was also gathered and verified through 
Thompson Reuter, Securities Data Company's U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database 
as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses in 
accordance to the methodology of (Moeller, et al., 2004). This information was 
considered for possible contributions to analysis and discussion.  
 Initial investigation of target opportunity including all of the previously 
prescribed indicated a potential unqualified pool of 561 firms with 2,971 identified 
current members of the acquired firm top management team as reported by Capital IQ™ 
on July 15, 2012. One thousand addressees were randomly selected from the qualified 
population. The Capital IQ™ database was used to extract acquiring company 
information for control variable data outlined in the following pages. Acquired leader-
management and contact information was attained through Capital IQ™ company 
records.  
Data Collection 
Survey instruments were mailed to acquisition contacts 18 to 24 months following 
the acquisition close date grounded on studies conducted by Krug (2003) and Datta and 
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Grant (1990) to remain consistent with the existing literature that indicates the primary 
impact of acquisitions occur shortly after the acquisition (Krug, 2003). Further 
justification for the near term follow-up was an attempt to avoid TMT turnover (Krug & 
Hegarty, 2001) and capture recent memory recollection of events and avoid deterioration 
in the quality of the data (Datta & Grant, 1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985). 
Main Effect Measures 
 
Autonomy (IV): Autonomy refers to the level of decision–making authority 
allocated to the acquired firm and its leadership. To measure the construct, all ten 
autonomy related items were extracted from the autonomy removal scale of Very (1997). 
The scale is applicable to assess the extent to which the buying firm involved itself in the 
acquired firm’s key decisions. The items address the acquired firm’s goals, operational 
and business level strategies, personnel practices, and policies about major capital 
investment involvement, and were previously used in multicultural tolerance studies of 
Chatterjee et al. (1992), Hambrick and Cannella (1993) and Ranft (2006). “Hambrick and 
Cannella (1993) noted on p. 746 of their study that Chatterjee et al. tolerance construct 
and autonomy removal are conceptually equivalent” (Very, et al., 1997, p. 603). Per the 
reported results, the test on the responses for the Very et al. (1997) scale revealed the 
construct is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89. A seven-point response scale was 
used, ranging from (1) [your firm decides] over (4) [consensus decides] representing the 
midpoint, to (7) [parent firm decides]. The ten specific measurements included; setting 
key performance goals, defining portfolio of business, setting key competitive strategies, 
defining key administrative policies, defining marketing budgets, setting research and 
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development budgets, setting production schedules, setting senior manager rewards, 
defining recruitment and promotion policies, and defining social policies.  
The original five-point Likert anchors of the Very et al. (1997) scales were not 
retained. Scales were modified from five to seven points to enhance consistency, 
reliability, validity and discriminating power (Preston & Colman, 2000). Previous 
investigations demonstrated little difference between five and seven point scales in terms 
of variation about the mean, skewness or kurtosis and determined that recalling between 
the scales resulted in comparable and reliable results (Dawes, 2008). Further support for 
the change follows studies conducted by Preston and Coleman (2000), who determined 
that scales with six or more response categories yield scores with greater reliability. 
Based on the scale anchors, a low score on the autonomy scale questions represents a 
high degree of acquired firm autonomy.  
Perceived post-merger integration success (DV): Perceived post-merger 
integration success refers to meeting or exceeding the anticipated stage performance 
expectations of the acquiring firm (Graebner, 2004). Such expectations include 
operational, financial and social integration. Perceived post-merger integration success 
was measured using the performance expectations scale of Pelham and Wilson (1996). 
There may be no reliable or practical alternative to perceptual inputs for certain types of 
SME research questions (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Dess and Robinson (1984b) found a 
strong correlation between subjective assessments of performance and their objective 
counterparts. Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986, 1987) found that informant 
perception data exhibited less method variance than some archival data. Perceived 
integration success measures are also endorsed and used by Graebner (2004) when 
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historical data does not exist or is not available to the researcher. Perceptual performance 
measures with an anchor relative to expectations, allows for greater comparability across 
types of businesses with varying standards of acceptable performance (Pelham & Wilson, 
1996). Due to the nature of the sampling of acquired SME firms, objective measures of 
performance are not readily available due to the proprietary nature of small firms and 
segregation of subunit financial performance detail. Alternative measurement scales of 
Datta (1991) and Zaheer (2011) were considered. The Pelham scale was selected for its 
parsimonious approach and mix of goal success factors including product, market and 
financial measurements. The desirable feature of the Pelham and Wilson (1996) scale is 
the incorporation of specific measures including financial elements. The measures 
included; 1, product success (2 items) - new product/service development and market 
development; 2, growth/share success (3 items) - sales growth rate, employment growth 
rate, and market share; 3, return on assets, (5 items) - profitability, operating profits, 
profit to sales (supply) ratio, cash flow from operations and return on investment. The 
results of reliability test in the Pelham et al. (1996) study produced an alpha of .74 for the 
category of perceived success. The original seven-point Likert scales of the Pelham & 
Wilson (1996) scale were retained as a seven-point scale for consistency, reliability, 
validity and discriminating power.  
Moderators 
Firm ownership identifies whether the acquired firm was privately held (not 
publicly traded or made available through public offerings) or founder owned and 
operated (not publically traded, founder controlled and managed) at the time of 
acquisition (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, et al., 2005; Sale, 2011). Ownership 
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were measured via dummy variables (0 = professionally managed private firm; 1 = 
founder owned and operated firm) based on dichotomous survey measures. The following 
definitions were provided to respondents of the survey instrument:  
“For purposes of this questionnaire, professionally managed private firm 
ownerships refer to closely held business not available to the public 
through open exchanges and are not required to meet the strict Securities 
and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public companies. 
Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however, 
shares are not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an 
initial public offering. An example of a professionally managed private 
company is the holding of assets by a private investor or private 
investment group or consortium operated by a team of professional 
managers such as found in privately held equity groups or venture capital 
firms with controlling equity of multiple firms. A founder owned and 
operated business is a firm that is actively operated by the founder-CEO 
whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not 
available to public markets (copied from question twelve in the survey 
instrument found in this document).”  
 
A follow-up question for founder owned and operated firms asked the percentage 
of pre-acquisition ownership was held by the founder, family members and non-family 
members. The information was accumulated and addressed in the discussion section of 
the final dissertation.  
Acquisition experience refers to the number of acquisition events experienced by 
the acquired firm TMT in the previous three years to minimize weakening of associations 
and minimize temporal interference of recall (Capron & Shen, 2007; Shrivastava, 2007). 
Acquired firm acquisition experience was a question on the survey instrument seeking 
subjects’ previous near term acquisition experience of being acquired or involved in 
acquiring others (Barrett, 1973; Capron & Shen, 2007). The question was posed as a 
simple yes-no selection and read, “Have you had direct executive-level experience with 
mergers or acquisitions?” If answered yes, a follow up question asked, “Please indicate 
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how many merger or acquisition integration events in which you have actively 
participated”.  
Control Variables 
Relative size of the acquired firms has been previously found to have a negative 
impact on post-merger success. Kitching (1967) observed a strong relationship between 
unsuccessful mergers of relatively small firms by larger concerns. Likewise, Biggakdike 
(1979) found that larger acquisitions out-performed smaller acquisitions (Beckmann, 
1977; Bergh, 2001; Biggadike, 1979). Acquired firm size was measured using the 
number of employees of the acquired firm (Pelham & Wilson, 1996). Acquiring firm size 
(number of employees) was retrieved from secondary data sources (Capital IQ™). 
Relative size data was used to compare perceived success of the survey respondents and 
compared to the ratio of relative size of the acquired firm to the acquiring firm for 
correlation.  
Degree of relatedness: Both the delegation of autonomy and acquisition success 
has been associated with industry relatedness of acquirers and the acquired (Capron & 
Shen, 2007; Chatterjee, 1986; Datta & Grant, 1990; Flanagan, 1996; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Porter, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Trautwein, 1990). Previous 
research involving the study of two-party publicly traded acquisitions relied on the 
matching of published SIC codes. Because this study focused on smaller public and 
private acquisitions, published SIC codes were not always available. To overcome this 
obstacle, a simple question added to the questionnaire provided continuous data regarding 
the perceived relatedness of the acquiring firm to the industry of the acquired. The 
question read, “Using your best judgment, please rank the industry relatedness (industry 
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segment, product offerings or process) of the pre-acquisition firm”. Ranking options 
were; 0% not at all related, 50% somewhat related, to 100% very related on a continuous 
choice scale for each category.  
Acquisition experience of the acquiring firm: Recent acquisition experience of 
the acquiring firm was determined by measuring acquiring firm M&A activity within the 
last three years (Capron & Shen, 2007; Shrivastava, 2007). The experience term mirrored 
that of the acquired firm TMT M&A experience. Records were sourced through the 
Capital IQ database 
Integrated: Several questions on the survey addressed the understood strategic 
purpose for the acquisition. High levels of integration may enhance synergistic potential, 
but it can also result in negative outcomes in the form of inter-organizational conflicts 
(Coff, 2002; Ellis, 2011; Harding & Rouse, 2007; Pablo, 1994; Ranft & Lord, 2000; 
Singh & Zollo, 1998). Questions regarding interpreted pre-and post-acquisition strategic 
objectives are posed through exploration of communicated objectives. The following 
question was presented to address the perceived degree of integration: “Do you feel the 
performance goals of the acquiring firm have been sufficiently communicated to the 
management team of the acquired firm?” Response options were provided in five 
categories: thoroughly communicated, reasonably communicated, somewhat 
communicated, vaguely communicated, not at all communicated. The information 
gathered was used to assess confidence in the perceived integration performance (DV) 
and to gauge how well performance objectives were communicated to the respondents. 
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Survey Preparation 
Minimal changes to the original scales were made for the perceptual constructs 
utilizing existing scales (autonomy and integration success). Single-item measures were 
crafted for the non-perceptual variables. Qualtrics™ designed web-based surveys were 
used. Internet-based survey and online survey are often used in research studies 
interchangeably (Shih & Fan, 2008). For purposes of this study, the terms web-based or 
internet-based surveys are used interchangeably, denoting postal mail or electronic mail 
(e-mail) notifications with links to a web survey. It has been noted that turnaround time 
of e-mail and web-based surveys is extremely high and the automation of several 
functions reduce collection errors often associated with hand coding (Cobanoglu, Warde, 
& Moreo, 2001). See Appendix II for a summary of the survey.  
Survey Invitation 
The survey invitation was designed to induce the strong feeling of “social 
exchange” consistent with Dillman’s (1978) notion of social exchange, in which he 
demonstrated that respondents reciprocate by treating the project seriously and returning 
the survey (Dillman, 1978; Hager, Wilson, Pollak, & Rooney, 2003; Trouteaud, 2004). 
This approach is supported by Crittenden (2011) emphasizing the prior lack of focus on 
the acquired firm perspective and the invitee’s opportunity to help fill that gap.  
Other studies suggest that potential survey respondents are more likely to 
participate when they feel a professional affinity with the sender or the subject matter 
(Guéguen & Jacob, 2002). High subject matter salience with potential respondents has 
been associated with stronger return rates (Kaplowitz, et al., 2004). Additionally, a 
nominal tangible reward may not provide incremental incentive for well-compensated 
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executives who associate social exchange meaning to the survey to be greater than a 
financial incentive (Barón, Breunig, Cobb-Clark, Gørgens, & Sartbayeva, 2009; Groves, 
Singer, & Corning, 2000). For these reasons the cover letter included an effort to connect 
the survey to a community associated research context (Marks, et al., 2001). Appendix III 
provides a copy of the survey invitation letter. 
Survey Administration 
 One thousand printed survey invitations were mailed through the U.S. Postal 
Service to the target population. Ninety-nine letters were returned as undeliverable or the 
addressee was no longer at that address. Two hundred eleven additional surveys were 
mailed electronically to an expanded target group of both U.S. and Canadian firms due to 
slow response from initial domestic audience. Eighty-two were returned as undeliverable. 
The inclusion of Canadian firms is not considered to be subject to significant cultural fit 
concerns (Breinlich, 2008; Tung & Verbeke, 2010; Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996).The 
additional survey targets were also not limited to transactions greater than ten million 
dollars as reflected in the original mailing. Smaller SMEs, particularly transactions 
involving founder owned enterprises often involve lower value transactions (McCarthy & 
Weitzel, 2009).  
An electronic reminder was sent to four hundred ninety two invitees 
approximately two weeks following the ground mail invitations. One hundred sixteen 
were returned as undeliverable. The total number of invitations sent by all methods 
applied was one thousand two hundred eleven. One hundred eighty one were retuned as 
undeliverable resulting in a best case assumed 85% delivery rate. The delivery rate does 
not include electronic messages delivered to junk mail or spam folders of the recipients.  
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Available literature on Web surveys and methods of response rate calculations  
widely vary and have yet to be agreed upon due to rapidly changing technology, access to 
technology, and corporate controls over use of technology (Johnson & Wislar, 2012; Sax, 
Gilmartin, & Bryant, 2003). According to Eysenbach and Eysenbach (2004), internet 
based survey responses should be measured as a view-completion ratio rather than an 
invitation-response ratio. Reporting response rates using such a method is felt to be a 
more accurate indication of receipt of the survey match to the ability to participate, not 
just willingness to participate. When calculating the number of surveys view/starts (131), 
to survey respondents (94) a 71% response rate was achieved. Data cleansing resulted in 
eighty-two usable surveys for a 64% response rate. For reporting purposes in this 
dissertation, calculations were based on invitations sent, less those returned as 
undeliverable divided by the number of surveys started as per the American Association 
for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (AAPOR, 2011; Johnson & Owens, 2003; 
Kaplowitz, et al., 2004). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Respondent Results 
 Ninety-four survey cases were received achieving a 9% response rate. Eight cases 
were incomplete, lacking responses beyond the instructions section and were removed. 
Four cases, two each, were self-identified as responding to the same acquisition event. 
The first response from each firm was chosen to represent the case. Two additional 
responses regarding foreign firm transactions were removed. The sample cleansing 
resulted in a net 8% response rate of eighty-two usable cases representing eighty-two 
distinct firms (AAPOR, 2011). Due to the small response rate, a common test for 
nonresponse bias was conducted. The following are the results and methods applied.  
 
Table 1 Nonresponse bias analysis using an independent sample t-test 
Variable 
Mean 
First 
Mailing 
SD 
First 
Mailing 
Mean 
Second 
Mailing 
SD 
Second 
Mailing 
t (81) p 
Perceived Autonomy  
(avg. Q10) 
4.87 1.700 4.69 1.586 .512 .610 
Perceived Success  
(avg. Q11) 
3.67 1.3207 3.93 1.632 -.820 .415 
Strategic Objectives 
Known (Q3) 
1.87 .7486 1.649 .6332 1.430 .157 
Strategic Objective 
Change (Q4) 
1.78 .6964 1.78 .8542 -.007 .995 
†p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001; n = 82 
 
A common way to test for non‐response bias is to compare the responses of those 
who respond to the first mailing of a questionnaire to those who respond to subsequent 
mailings (Clendenning, Field, & Jensen, 2013; Groves, 2006). Those who return 
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subsequent mailings are, in effect, a sample of non‐respondents (to the first mailing), and 
under the assumption that they are representative of that group (Couper, Kapteyn, 
Schonlau, & Winter, 2007). Typical uses of a T-test for two independent samples might 
include testing for differences two groups (Hair, et al., 2010). Nonresponse bias was 
tested by using this method. Four key perceptual measures were chosen which the 
researcher felt were fair representations of the targeted population. The measures selected 
were, average perceived autonomy (independent variable, Q10), the average perceived 
success (dependent variable, Q11), awareness of the strategic objectives (random variable 
Q3), and did the strategic objectives change (random variable Q4). Survey data received 
from the original mailing was segregated from follow-up reminders and second mailing 
targets. Means of the specific responses of the two groups were compared and analyzed 
for statistical significance using a simple T-test. The results of the analysis did not 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups, 
therefore, there is no evidence that nonresponse bias exists through this method of 
analysis (Groves, 2006).  
Missing Data 
Very little data was missing for key response items. Twenty-four respondents did 
not provide the name of the acquired firm. Eight of those respondents left contact 
information and were contacted directly, researched through LinkedIn or associated 
through Capital IQ with the acquired firm. Once the acquired firm was identified, 
accessing the acquiring firm information, size and age accomplished through Capitol 
IQ™. For cases in which neither the respondent information or the acquiring firm 
information was readily available within the survey, the respondents’ internet protocol 
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address recorded by Qualtrics™ supplied either a company name or a user name and the 
information was traced back through Capital IQ or the company website in most cases. 
Other missing data included parent firm data. Missing data for acquiring firm key 
measurement items was acquired through secondary data from Standard and Poor’s 
Capital IQ™, company websites and other web based data services including internet 
protocol service such as Whois, MYIP.MS, IP-adress.com among others. Google Maps 
was also used to track addresses and identify physical locations of the respondent in 
many cases. Although the method was productive, some firms could not be identified and 
were not used in the analysis. The remaining missing data was determined through 
mathematical means as allocating item category averages or trending scores. Only four 
instances were addressed in such manner among all cases. Excess missing data from 
uncompleted surveys were dropped. Eighty-two surveys provided sufficient power for 
analysis (Hair, et al., 2010).  
Dummy and Composite Variables 
Several variables were transformed to accommodate regression analysis. The first 
variable, integration, delineated whether the acquired firm was integrated into the 
acquiring firms existing physical operations or remained a stand-alone operation. If the 
acquired firm was not integrated, it was transformed to zero; if it was integrated it 
transformed into a one. A second dummy transformed three individual categorical 
relatedness responses product, process and market, into a single dummy variable. The 
new variable represented the degree of relatedness. 
Relative size was transformed into ratios by dividing the acquired firm size into 
the acquiring firm size represented by number of employees at both firms at time of the 
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event (Pelham & Wilson, 1996). Archetype was transformed by combining professionally 
managed responses from public and private firms into category one (1) to represent 
professional, non-owner managers and founder owned and operated firms into category 
zero (0). The composite average of perceived autonomy items represented the autonomy 
variable. A composite average was also used for perceived integration success. 
Statistical Analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was executed on the two borrowed scales to 
provide confidence that the Very (1997) autonomy factors and the Pelham and Wilson 
(1996) perceived integration success factors indeed measure the intended variables of 
interest. The Exploratory Factor Analyses are provided in Table 2. The process was 
essential since the scale of the autonomy factor was modified from a five-point to a 
seven-point scale (Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000; Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & 
King, 2006). Additionally, the two scales were used on a common survey instrument. The 
use of EFA techniques to partition data from multi-trait or multi-method matrices into a 
particular perception trait provided the reader with greater confidence in the reliability of 
the instrument and modified scales (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
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Table 2 Exploratory factor analysis 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component Cronbach’s 
Alpha  1 2 
Perceived Autonomy   .96 
Goals .72  .88 
Profit .72  .88 
Strategy .85  .88 
Policy .86  .88 
Inventory .86  .88 
Budgets .70  .88 
Markets .86  .88 
R&D .80  .88 
Products .77  .88 
Bonuses .84  .88 
Recruitment .87  .88 
Advancement .87  .88 
Culture .77  .88 
Perceived  
Integration Success 
  .96 
New Product  .83 .89 
Marketing  .80 .89 
Growth  .88 .89 
Employment    .75 .89 
Market Share  .88 .89 
Profit  .90 .89 
Sales  .91 .89 
ROI  .91 .89 
ROA  .92 .89 
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A principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to assess the 
underlying structure for the 13 items of the perceived autonomy variable and the ten 
items associated with the perceived integration success variable. The assumptions of 
independent sampling were met. The assumptions of normality, linear relationships 
between variables and the variables being correlated were checked. The initial extraction 
yielded a 3-factor solution. The first component explained 44% of the variance. The 
second component explained 27% of the variance and the third component explained less 
than 5% of the variance. 71% of the variance was explained using component one and 
two. Two items, autonomy-culture and success-cash-flow produced third factor scores of 
.37 and .37 respectively. Both items however, also produced significantly stronger scores, 
.77 and .84, on their primary component factor. Removal of integration success cash flow 
item resulted a robust two-factor component structure with all items achieving a 
component score >.7 (Hair, et al., 2010) on all autonomy related items and integration 
items separately. The two-factor solution with thirteen autonomy items and the nine 
remaining integration success items explained 71% of the variance (combined). 
Component one, autonomy explained 44% and component two, integration success 
accounted for 27% of the variance.  
Common Method Bias 
Self-report bias could have been unavoidable due to the respondent providing the 
response to these variables is the same (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). To overcome these 
limitations, it was anticipated that sufficient returns from multiple respondents of each 
firm will allow for a separation of responses regarding autonomy constructs and 
performance constructs. The leaders’ responses to autonomy questions would have been 
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useful for the autonomy construct response and the perceived integration performance 
construct could be gathered from top management team responses. Both sets of questions 
were posed to all survey participants and responses could then have been segregated 
during analysis. This opportunity did not avail itself as only two responses from two 
different firms replied regarding the same acquisition event. Previous research of Datta 
(1991), Burgman (1983) and Kitching (1967) encountered similar restrictions. Podsakoff, 
et al. (2003) recommended a solution to single source respondents in such cases was to 
obtain the cultural measures and seek performance measurements from archival sources. 
This solution was not feasible for two very important reasons; first, integration 
performance is not a typically measured or recorded data point; second, performance 
measurements of acquired and subunit entities are most typically rolled into larger, 
aggregated reports of the parent company and are therefore not available for public 
access. Podsakoff and Todor (1985) suggested the use of data partialling technique to 
address the common source bias concerns in a self-respondent analysis, however, 
Kemery and Dunlap (1986, p. 259) concluded that partialling does not minimize the 
possible effects of common method variance and goes to cite additional research that 
supports their conclusion that it should not be used. An attempt at partialling 
organizational archetype was conducted in post hoc testing but produced no significant 
change in results.  
Although common method variance could not be completely ruled out, 
examination of other studies has determined the method to be acceptable without 
additional controls or calculations (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Doty & Glick, 1998; 
Evans, 1985; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Spector & Brannick, 1995). While bias may be 
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present and even unavoidable in some cases, particularly with SME studies, it may not 
significantly affect results or conclusions (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). 
Further, self-report performance data has been strongly correlated with objective data 
(Dess & Robinson Jr, 1984a; Love, et al., 2002). Future studies could take additional 
steps to measure potential effects of single source self-respondent data on the analysis of 
the findings. Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3 Correlations, means, and standard deviations 
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Regression Results 
To test my hypothesized relationships, I performed a hierarchical moderated 
regression analysis and reported the variables in five steps (see Table 4 for results). The 
results were the same when each interaction effect was calculated separately.  
Model 1 represents the inclusion of four control variables, relative size, degree of 
relatedness, acquired firm integration, and parent firm merger and acquisition experience. 
This model explains 4% of the variance of the dependent variable. The R2 of Model 1 
was .08 with an adjusted R2 of .036, R2Δ of .08 and a significance of .15. 
To test Hypotheses 1, Model 2 adds perceived autonomy and the direct effect of 
archetype. This model explains 8% of the variance. The R2 of Model 2 was .15 with an 
adjusted R2 of .08, ΔR2 of .07 and a significance of .06. 
Hypothesis 2 was tested with Model 3 including the interaction effects of 
Autonomy and Archetype, explaining 8% of the variance. The R2 of Model 3 was .16 
with and adjusted R2 of .08, ΔR2 of .01 and a significance of .41.  
Model 4 introduced the direct effect of acquired firm leader prior merger and 
acquisition experience to the independent variable, perceived autonomy. This model 
represented 7.2% of the variance. The R2 of Model 4 was .16 with an adjusted R2 of .07, 
ΔR2 of .00 and a significance of .59. 
Model 5 tests the third hypothesis where the interaction effect of the firm leader’s 
prior acquisition experience was added. Model 5 represented 7 % of the variance 
explained. The R2 of Model 5 was .17 with an adjusted R2 of .07, ΔR2 of .01 and a 
significance of .47. 
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The results indicated statistical significance of only H1. The effect of perceived 
autonomy on perceived integration success (H1) indicated a negative relationship 
opposite to the hypothesized direction. H1, H2 and H3 were not supported. 
The potential for multicollinearity between the independent variable, perceived 
autonomy and dependent variable, perceived integration success with this study was 
addressed. A multicollinearity analysis found all variance inflation factors were within 
acceptable range (Hair, et al., 2010).  
The possibility of a common method bias due to common source sampling was 
addressed by a single-factor test using the procedure suggested by Podsakoff and Organ 
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). I performed an exploratory factor 
analysis with a varimax rotation using the eigenvalue greater than one criterion and found 
that no single factor was able to explain more than 20% of the variance. The first factor 
captured 20% of the variance in the data. The second factor captured 18%. The third 
factor represented 14% of the variance. Rotated sums of squared loading produced 
similar results. Factor one sum of square loading equaled 19%, factor two, 18% and 
factor three 15%. Common method concerns are further mitigated by the data 
relationships created by my predicted interactions because respondents were unlikely to 
recognize the moderation hypotheses or to respond in a manner that may lead to spurious 
findings (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006). 
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Table 4 Hierarchical regression results  
 
†p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)  
n = 82 in all models 
Model 1 = Controls 
Model 2 = Model 1 + Autonomy + direct effect of Archetype 
Model 3 = Model 2 + interaction Autonomy*Archetype 
Model 4 = Model 1 + Autonomy + direct effect of Acquired leader experience 
Model 5 = Model 4 + interaction Autonomy*Experience 
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Post-Hoc Analyses 
Because the regression analysis included public company archetypes to achieve 
the power requirements for sample testing, a post hoc test was conducted on the 
archetype factor. Particular attention was paid to responses that indicated the 
organizational archetype of the acquired firm.  
A Bonferroni one-way between groups analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of including public acquired firms within the analyzed archetype 
factor. A sample of eighty-two responses was tested. Twenty-four responses were 
associated with public firms, twenty-eight with professional managers of private firms, 
twenty-eight represented family founder owner-operators and two respondents indicated 
they were non-founder managers related to the founder. Post hoc comparisons using the 
Bonferroni tests indicated that public firms represented a Mean score of .29 with a SD 
equal to .458. Professional managers of private firms represented a Mean score of .33, 
with a SD equal to .48 and did not differ significantly from the founder owned and 
operated group represented a Mean of .34 with a SD of .48. Both public and private 
responses were determined to be significant at .000 and therefore the null hypothesis was 
not supported. These findings indicate that the inclusion of acquired public firm 
responses may be used for the regression analysis (Demšar, 2006; Hochberg & 
Benjamini, 2006).  
Additional confirmation of the linear regression findings were achieved through 
analysis of data using Smart PLS™ Partial Least Square (PLS) analysis tools (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014; Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). The analysis of data using PLS 
produced 17% variance explained of the overall model compared to a 17% explanatory 
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power of the complete regression model. Very similar to the regression results, the 
relationship of perceived autonomy to perceived integration success was significant, but 
also in a negative correlational direction producing a -.29 from the PLS compared to a -
.27 regression result. Concurrent with the regression analysis, moderation testing did not 
produce a significant result for archetype or acquired firm experience in the PLS findings. 
Inferential tests for curvilinear relationships as per Hair et al. (2010) were also conducted 
between perceived autonomy and perceived integration success producing no evidence of 
curvilinear relationships.  
The interpretation of post-hoc testing was found to support the linear regression 
results. Additional analysis and configuration experimentation failed to produce 
materially different results. It can be concluded from the additional testing that the 
regression findings are valid and reliable.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between perceived autonomy and 
perceived integration success. While the results of this study showed a negative and 
significant relationship contrary to the original conjecture, these findings are not 
contradictory to other studies. For instance, Datta and Grant (1990) demonstrated a 
negative relationship between allocation of autonomy to acquired firms and integration 
success of both related and unrelated large firms. The findings by Datta and Grant (1990) 
suggested that unrelated acquired firms were typically allowed greater autonomy than 
acquired firms that were closely related to the acquirer’s knowledge of acquired firm 
product, processes and industry. The findings of this dissertation support the negative 
direction of perceived autonomy and perceived success with related small and medium 
enterprises. The Datta and Grant (1990) study also showed that the level of integration 
was significantly associated with autonomy allocation. Acquired firms that were 
significantly related to the acquiring firm’s existing markets and operations were more 
likely to receive less autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1990). The relationship of integration, 
industry relatedness and autonomy allocation are typically closely associated (Barney, 
1988; Datta & Grant, 1990). Forty-two percent of the dissertation survey respondents 
indicated their acquired firm remained as a stand-alone operation yet ranked their 
relatedness to the acquiring firm at 64%, relatedness being measured on a score of 0-100, 
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100 being completely related. Fifty-two percent reported that the acquired firm was 
integrated into the acquiring firm operations with a relatedness score of 76%. Conversely, 
the stand-alone operations indicated a slightly lower perceived average autonomy score 
of 4.40 on a Likert scale of 1-7, 7 representing complete autonomy, compared to 
integrated firms reporting an average autonomy score of 5.13. While the perceived 
autonomy scores appear to align with the findings relatedness relationships reported by 
Datta and Grant (1990), data received for this dissertation did not produce sufficiently 
granular responses from firms or the degree of integration of surveyed firms to 
empirically support or contradict the relatedness findings of Datta and Grant (1990). 
Another recent study by Zaheer et al. (2013) also found a significant but negative 
relationship between acquired firm post-acquisition autonomy and structural integration. 
Structural integration refers to the consolidating the functional activities of the acquired 
firm into its reporting hierarchy of the acquiring firm (Vancil & Buddrus, 1979). As does 
Datta and Grant (1990, p. 13), Zaheer, et al. (2013) also define autonomy as “the amount 
of day-to-day freedom that the acquired firm management is given to manage its business 
without close control by the parent company”. Zaheer et al. (2013) measured autonomy 
by using an average of a four item, four-point scale assessing decision-making authority 
concerning strategy, marketing, R&D and operations. These items were also included  
both in this dissertation and in the Datta and Grant (1990) study. Unlike the Datta and 
Grant (1990) study, the results produced by Zaheer et al. (2013) did not demonstrate 
significant differences in autonomy allocation and the degree of integration. The Zaheer 
et al. (2013) focus rather was directed toward post acquisition autonomy allocations 
associated with the integration of similar and complementary acquisitions. While 
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similarity and complimentary are both dimensions of relatedness, they are a more finely 
grained distinction of Datta and Grant’s (1990) relatedness. The use of the more granular 
categories by Zaheer et al. (2013) was designed to further investigate the relationship of 
post-acquisition autonomy and integration. The Zaheer et al. (2013) study suggested that 
previous acquisition relatedness studies might have produced the appearance of a 
negative relation between autonomy and level of integration in similar and 
complementary acquisitions but did not address a distinction between related or unrelated 
acquisitions. “Our results show, integration and autonomy are negatively correlated, and 
integration has a significantly negative effect on autonomy granted” (Zaheer, 2013, p. 
625). This dissertations’ results indicate that perceived autonomy has a negative 
relationship with integration success, which might be partially explained by the Zaheer et 
al. (2013) findings in that autonomy and similar or complimentary acquisitions might 
predispose the authority allocated to acquired firms and degree of integration planned for. 
The effects of industry relatedness were acknowledged in the dissertation and included as 
a measurable control within the dependent variable, but not to the degree of granularity 
measured in the Zaheer et al. (2013) study. Nonetheless, the dissertation findings do not 
conflict with Zaheer et al. (2013), but provide additional support regarding the direction 
of post-acquisition autonomy associated with integration and relatedness of the acquired 
firm.  
There were several unique aims of this inquiry such as measuring the perceptions 
of the acquiring firm leaders and the focus on small to medium sized acquired firms that 
were not considered in the Datta and Grant (1990) or the recent Zaheer et al. (2013)  
studies. It is also noteworthy that the average score for acquired firm industry relatedness 
92 
 
 
 
in this dissertation was 81% on a 0-100 relatedness scale. Both Datta and Grant (1990) 
and Zaheer et.al. (2013) have similarly strong relatedness scores associated with target 
acquisitions. Although 40% of the dissertation’s acquisitions sampled remained as 
standalone operations, the respondents indicated significant industry relatedness. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the findings of this dissertation do not contradict those 
of Datta and Grant (1990) or Zaheer et al. (2013) but instead support those conclusions 
through alternative measures. The high degree, 81% of industry relatedness, for firms that 
were both integrated into acquiring firms operations and those not integrated could have 
resulted in an absence of diversity in the perceived autonomy scores possibly masking the 
hypothesized directional relationships of autonomy and success. The lack of unrelated 
acquisitions may partially explain the absence of findings in this dissertation. 
Central to the investigation of post–acquisition autonomy is the intended degree 
of integration (Pablo, 1994; Singh & Zollo, 1998). Degree of integration can be defined 
as the degree of post-acquisition change in an organization’s leadership and decision-
making administrative controls (Pablo, 1994). The degree of integration is important to 
successful acquisitions  (Whitaker, 2012). High levels of integration may theoretically 
enhance synergistic potential, but can also result in negative outcomes in the form of 
increased coordination costs and/or inter-organizational conflicts (Pablo, 1994). As 
discussed earlier, firms are acquired for many different reasons, such as new market 
penetration, capacity expansion, diversification, access to technology and even 
opportunism, to mention only a few examples (Napier, 1989; Veugelers & Cassiman, 
1999). According to Lubatkin et al. (1999, p. 58), “the buying firm rarely allows the 
acquired top management team full autonomy, even in conglomerate acquisitions, the 
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motivation to acquire usually stems from the buyer's belief that it can utilize the acquired 
firm's physical and human capital more efficiently than was the case beforehand”. 
However, Datta and Grant’s (1990) conclusions acknowledged the importance of post-
merger autonomy under degree of firm relatedness. The Datta and Grant (1990) findings 
indicated that firms acquired in unrelated industries received greater decision-making 
authority than firms acquired in related industries or those using processes similar to that 
of the acquirer. Datta and Grant (1990) further concluded that firms wishing to integrate 
or expand a familiar process into existing operations are more likely to structurally 
integrate or merge the acquired business and its processes into the existing institutional 
configuration under preexisting control and decision mechanisms. Firms acquiring 
unfamiliar processes or market positions will rely on the acquired institutional structure 
and leadership by allowing greater autonomy and decision-making authority to the 
acquired firm’s management team (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). As Meyer and Lieb-
Dóczy (2003, p. 26) put it, “The outcome of post-acquisition transformation and 
integration depends on managerial action taken during the process”. Even considering a 
methodical, integrative process, local activities are usually managed in an interdependent 
way since the integration approach and execution of integration activities require local 
management and decision-making (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991). Contrary to this view, Falkner et al. (2003) determined that however traumatic an 
acquisition might be to a small new subsidiary, the result was in most cases a substantial 
improvement in the acquired firm’s economic performance. This may not be the case 
when firms acquire to expand their organizational knowledge. The acquisition of human 
capital is often a strategic aim of the acquisition (Coff, 2002; Harding & Rouse, 2007). 
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However, in the face of loss of autonomy, talent often leaves the organization (Krug & 
Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, et al., 1999; Siehl & Smith, 1990). The likelihood of top team 
turnover immediately following the acquisition may have contributed to the lack of 
findings. Those respondents who remained may not have suffered a loss of autonomy or 
may have gained autonomy in the restructuring.  
An important determinant for level of integration is how useful are the existing 
resources in the management of the acquired company (Paruchuri, et al., 2006; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). If the acquisition was made for plant, property and equipment and not 
the softer side of a firm – people, relationships and creativity – acquired firms are likely 
to experience greater degree of integration and, therefore, less decision-making autonomy 
(Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000). It is important to acknowledge that acquired firm 
respondents may not have been privileged to the full intention of the acquiring firm and 
therefore the true motivation for the purchases are undetermined. Since the dissertation 
expressly address the perceptions of acquired firm respondents, the individual 
interpretations of the acquiring firm cannot be measured and may also have contributed 
to the lack of findings by masking external factors that may have affected the perceived 
relationship of autonomy and integration.  
The study of post-acquisition integration has long been restricted by ascertaining 
the acquirers’ intended degree of integration (Ellis, 2011; Pablo, 1994; Ranft & Lord, 
2000). Acquisitions made to diversify risk are commonly decentralized, allowing the 
acquired firms greater autonomy to run and manage operations. Firms acquired outside 
the acquiring firm’s experience are also allowed greater autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1990). 
Because this dissertation assessed the acquired firm perspective in contrast to much of 
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previous research, the acquiring firm planned strategy or intended level of structural 
integration was difficult to identify with certainty. Again, the inability to ascertain with 
certainty the strategic objectives and motivations of the acquiring firm may have limited 
the opportunity to add additional variables or empirically account for effects unknown to 
the respondents.  
There are several additional observations, which may have influenced the results 
consistent with the aforementioned considerations. Respondents in this dissertation were 
asked if they felt the goals and objectives were reasonably communicated to the acquired 
firm management and if the success measures were sufficiently understood through a 
series of questions within the survey. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents indicated 
the goals and objectives of the firm post-acquisition were comprehensively known to 
them. Forty-nine percent indicated the goals were generally known. Sixty-nine percent of 
the responses indicated that the goals and objects of the firm had changed little or not at 
all. Of those respondents, 24% felt the goals and objectives were thoroughly 
communicated to them, 38% reasonably communicated and 23% felt they had been 
somewhat communicated. Only 14% responded that the post-acquisition goals and 
objectives of the acquired firm were vaguely communicated or not at all communicated. 
Overwhelmingly, the respondents indicated that they were familiar with the post-
acquisition goals and objectives. This increases confidence in the respondent’s capacity 
to respond reasonably to the questions on integration success measures. The data are 
significant because they indicate that the perceived integration success measurements that 
include strategic and financial measurements similar to those in Datta and Grant (1990) 
and Zaheer et al. (2013), are founded on established and known achievement 
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measurements. Further, because the goals were generally believed to be reasonable and 
achievable, the value of success measurements can be deemed valid. If it had been 
determined that the goals were generally unknown, or considered unreasonable, it might 
be concluded that the negative relationship of perceived autonomy and integration 
success could be an effect of individual resistance to change causing a possible 
impediment to integration (Choi, Holmberg, Löwstedt, & Brommels, 2011; Thomas & 
Hardy, 2011). Because there was little indication of resistance to post-acquisition goals or 
the reasonableness of the goals, it is unlikely that resistance to change accounted for the 
negative direction of the relationship of autonomy to integration success (Colman & 
Lunnan, 2011). Summary conclusions for lack of findings of Hypothesis 1 are provided 
in Table 5. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted founder owner-operated acquired firm leaders would have 
a greater resistance to changes in authority and hence produce greater resistance to post-
acquisition integration (i.e. change) than non-founder leaders. The findings of the 
dissertation analysis did not provide support for the prediction despite equal and 
statistically meaningful representation for private, public and founder firm acquisitions as 
demonstrated by the Bonferroni test. Although 34% of the respondents indicated senior 
most positions, only two respondents indicated they were related to the founder and no 
responses were received from a founder owner-operator. The observed lack of 
distinctions across the organizational archetypes could be due to non-family respondents 
who are accustomed to limited authority and execute duties at the will of the autonomous 
founder (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). In the case of significant autonomy, other categories of 
professionally managed private corporations and public corporations, did not differ 
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greatly from non-owner founder owned and operated businesses. In small and medium 
founder owned and operated businesses, the organization and the leader are typically 
closely associated (Schein, 1995). Employees may remain separate and potentially 
transferable to a different organization without the threat of autonomy loss;  in fact the 
opportunity to gain decision-making authority may exist (Bernhard & O'Driscoll, 2011). 
Under such circumstances, the moderating effect of pre-acquisition organizational 
archetype upon perceived autonomy and integration success of founder owned and 
operated employees might be obfuscated by an expectation of greater autonomy than that 
provided before the acquisition, by the founder owned and operated archetype. Family 
and founder firms often retain non-family professional managers who can be allowed 
significant decision-making authority (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Employment contracts of  family owned and founder owned 
firms with performance factors and authority rights are not uncommon and may be 
similar to the authority and rewards found in private and public firms (Verbeke & Kano, 
2012) thereby negating the change effects pursued within the research model. The 
likelihood that professional managers represented the founder owned and operated firm 
in this study may well have obscured the founder-owner operated effects that I sought to 
explore in the archetype.  
 Another possible impediment to quantifying the full impact of pre-acquisition 
organizational archetype effects was a change of leadership during integration. 
Respondents indicated that 51% of the acquired firm chief executive was retained at time 
of acquisition; however, 48% of the chief executives were installed by the acquiring firm. 
Of those chief executives installed, 93% originated from the acquiring publically traded 
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firm. Considering that virtually half of the acquired firm chief executives actually 
represented professional managers from public firms, the attempt to identify archetype 
origination effects may have been handicapped. Consequently, the responses may not 
have been truly indicative of acquired firm perspectives, which could have contributed to 
a lack of findings. Installed chief executives of business units can heavily influence the 
resource allocations, risk choice, and operational effectiveness of the acquired 
organization (Davies, Finlay, McLenaghen, & Wilson, 2006; Schein, 1992). However, 
contrary to this position, Hambrick and Mason (1984)  suggested that, based on an upper 
echelon’s perspective, the organization becomes a reflection of its top executives, and the 
characteristics and functioning of the top management team have far greater potential for 
predicting organizational outcomes, than do the characteristics of the chief executive. 
Top management team characteristics consistently predict organizational outcomes better 
than chief executive influences (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). This view suggests that 
the reflection of the acquired firm’s chief executive might not influence the responses of 
the top team management. Nonetheless, the influence of the chief executive on the 
strategic and operational decision making cannot be disregarded, especially in light of an 
installed leader inserted in the midst of organizational change (DiGeorgio, 2001; Kim, et 
al., 2010; Lee & Alexander, 1998; Papadakis & Barwise, 2002; Piccolo & Colquitt, 
2006). Unfortunately, there were insufficient same-firm responses from the survey to 
evaluate the influence of an installed chief executive from a different organizational 
structure with the acquired firm’s pre-acquisition archetype or its impact on integration 
success. The inability to control for top team turnover and installed leaders may have 
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contributed to the absence of findings. Summary conclusions for lack of findings of 
Hypothesis 2 are provided in Table 5. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted perceived autonomy of the acquired leaders and the 
relationship between integration successes was moderated by previous experience with 
merger and acquisition integration of the acquired firm leadership. The findings did not 
provide a significant moderating effect within the theoretical model. Literatures suggest 
that acquiring firms with M&A experience were more successful integrating acquisitions 
into their operations than firms that had no M&A experience (Very & Schweiger, 2001). 
This dissertation tested for a possible moderating effect of acquired firm leaders M&A 
learnings from previous experience on the relationship of perceived autonomy and 
perceived integration success. The lack of significant findings could have been affected 
by the use of organizational learning theories in place of residual effects of individual 
learnings.  
Organizational learning refers to the processes of institutionalizing rules, 
practices, routines, and conventions of an organization (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
1991). Crossman, Lane and White (1999) described a framework of organizational 
learning as four processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. 
These processes are viewed to be inextricably inter-linked at individual, group and 
organizational levels and involve tensions between the assimilation of new learnings and 
reinforcement of historic learnings (Crossan, et al., 1999). Established learnings are 
supported through the conventions and routines institutionalized within the organization. 
“Routines are transmitted through socialization, education, imitation, professionalization, 
personnel movement, mergers and acquisitions. They [routines and conventions] change 
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as a result of experience within a community of other learning organizations” (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 320). First-order organizational learnings are routines and processes that 
serve to maintain organizational stability and sustain existing rules (Lant & Mezias, 
1992; March, 1981). Second-order organizational learnings are characterized by the 
exploration of alternative routines, rules, technologies, goals, and improved efficiency. 
Second-order learning emerges from the realization that historical experiences and 
practices may not be applicable to the current situation or new organizational structure 
(Lant & Mezias, 1992; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). 
Organizational learning in merger and acquisition studies takes two distinct 
tracks. One is focused on how experience with assimilation of new groups has a higher 
propensity for success when the acquirer has greater experience with integration and the 
other is the benefit from incorporating knowledge and experience assets into the 
acquiring company’s repository (McDonald, et al., 2008). According to McDonald, 
Westphal, and Graebner (2008), the value of experience is recognized and dependent 
upon successful integration in both directions. The importance of retaining that 
knowledge from both acquired management and other firm resources is generally 
understood (Marsh & Stock, 2006). Human capital resources are an integral element of 
the resource-based view and contribute greatly to organizational learning (Barney, 1991b, 
2001b; Coff, 2002). 
Acquired business autonomy is recognized by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) to 
facilitate second-order learning. Their research further demonstrates the benefits of 
extracting the human capital of the acquired firm while the enterprise benefits from the 
additional resources provided by the new owners. Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) 
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emphasize that organizational and behavioral learning is a two way process of give and 
take, but concluded that learning and knowledge sharing required higher level of 
autonomy, particularly when associated with significant cross-cultural and specific 
localization experience is involved. If successful integration is dependent upon the 
coordination of M&A experience of both the acquired and acquirer, as McDonald, 
Westphal, and Graebner (2008) have asserted, one might expect to see an effect of 
leaders with M&A experience in the tests for moderation effect within this dissertation. 
The lack of significance detected for acquired firm leadership M&A experience could be 
the result of differences between organizational learning and individual learning.  
Organizational learning and experience with integration may also lead to 
recognition of the depth and degree of integration. Pablo (1994) pointed out that 
experienced acquirers will better understand the degree of integration needed and 
therefore will allocate autonomy level better according to need. This concept brings into 
view the perceived human capital of the acquired firm and equates that with the resource 
base already in possession. The greater equipped the purchasing company is with tacit 
knowledge of the firm and market, the less need for autonomy of the acquired firm  
(Chatterjee, et al., 1992). The data analysis of this study revealed an acquired firm 
segment average relatedness score of 81% and an overall average relatedness score of 
72% combining segment relatedness, product relatedness and process relatedness scores 
ranging from 0 being not at all related, to 100 completely related. Based on Chatterjee et 
al. (1992) assertions, the significant weight of degree of relatedness of the surveyed 
population, embedded knowledge of acquired firm leaders’ previous M&A experience 
might not be recognizable through the methods applied in the dissertation model. 
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Another perspective associated with the degree of organizational learning often 
perceived as beneficial to the acquiring firm, is the opportunity to retain or install new 
managers. Recognition of this parental choice may motivate retained leaders to cooperate 
regardless of how much autonomy is given to the acquired organization. “Also, if the 
acquisition is primarily motivated by the access to undervalued or underexploited assets, 
such as brands or location, the decision on the retention of [autonomy] is only loosely 
connected to the one on the degree of integration of the productive assets” (Zollo & 
Singh, 2004, p. 1241). Zollo and Singh (2004)  attempted to measure not only the degree 
of integration, but tie it to the concept of perceived organizational learning and the 
benefits of greater autonomy of the acquired firm (Westphal & Shaw, 2005). According 
to Zollo and Singh (2004) the accumulation of tacit knowledge through acquisition, 
experience turns out to be a non-significant predictor of performance. The Zollo and 
Singh (2004), findings validate the mixed results of the previous literatures on the 
performance implications of accumulating acquisition experience. Their conclusions 
suggest that organizations, not individuals codify knowledge derived from previous 
acquisition experiences. “Mere exposure to integration processes and events does not 
seem to suffice” (Zollo & Singh, 2004, p. 1248). The dissertation results also did not find 
significant evidence of a moderating effect produced by individual M&A experience on 
the relationship of perceived autonomy and perceived integration success, which support 
the Zollo and Singh (2004) findings. 
Studies reflecting the benefits of organizational learning within the buy-side of an 
acquisition identify the ways in which organizational experiences become imbedded into 
the programs, processes and routines of an acquiring firm (Ranft, 2006). There is an 
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unclear distinction in theory today regarding the retention and application of individual 
learning and organizational learning (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). Whereas organizational 
learning is a basis available to, and shared by the organization through embedded 
knowledge, it can be institutionalized into practice and process, however individual 
learnings, despite that they may be retained by the individual, are not easily accessed by 
others and may succumb to environmental circumstance and therefore mollified or not 
leveraged (Argyris & Schön, 1999; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). Gathering and anchoring 
organizational learnings and their incorporation into practice differs greatly from 
individual extraction and application (Weick, 1991). The institutionalization of 
organizational experiences may be more robust and more easily accessed than individual 
learnings that might not share the common foundation of the circumstance or players 
involved (Zaheer, 2013). Information processing that is based upon the retrieval of 
information from memory can differ among individuals as well (Lähteenmäki, et al., 
2002). Responses to situations also vary from individual to individual and the freshness 
of the experience has significance upon the recall of the experience (Walsh & Ungson, 
1991). If individual experience, unlike organizational experience is not codified or 
entrenched into structural processes of individuals, variation can occur and benefits of 
personal M&A experience among individuals may not have statistically determinable 
effect on the relationship of perceived autonomy and perceived integration success. It 
may have been inappropriate to attempt to evaluate institutionalized organizational 
experience of the acquired firm, (a control variable) with individual experiences that may 
or may not have been instituted within the acquired firm and therefore contributed to the 
lack of findings.  
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Because this study attempted to measure individual experiences from the 
perspective of the acquired firm, survey respondents were asked about previous 
experience with mergers or acquisitions. The question used to measure a possible 
moderating effect was binary (i.e., did the respondent have prior experience or not). 70% 
of the respondents indicated they had executive level experience with a merger or 
acquisition before the measured event. Thirty percent indicated they did not. Of those 
who did have experience, 89% responded that they had experience with more than one 
event. Seventy-eight percent of all respondents indicated that the acquired firm had not 
been acquired within the last three years. These results have two important inferences. 
First, the acquired firm respondents who had no acquisition experience would not likely 
have experiential learnings to process and incorporate into organizational knowledge. 
Second, although many respondents indicated previous experience with M&A, their 
individual experiences may not have been shared with other members of the acquired or 
the acquiring firm. Summary conclusions for lack of findings are provided in Table 5.  
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Table 5 Findings discussion summary  
Context 
Possible explanations for absence 
of findings  
Recommendations for future 
research 
Hypothesis 1 
Higher perceived levels of post-
acquisition autonomy by the 
acquired firm leaders will be 
positively associated with 
perceived post-acquisition 
integration success. 
 
1. Lack of range in autonomy allocation 
due to a strong relatedness factor 
among surveyed firms might have 
diminished differences in perceived 
autonomy among responders 
2. Insufficient granularity for degree of 
integration measurements  
3. Inability to survey departed acquired 
management  
4. Undetermined buy-side motivation for 
acquisition may have obfuscated 
meaningful antecedents 
1. Determining a better mix of 
acquired firms from unrelated 
industries 
2. Incorporate measures for 
depth of integration into the 
acquiring firms existing 
structure 
3. Reach acquired firm managers 
nearer to the transaction event  
4. Conduct acquiring firm 
interviews to augment 
acquired firm perspectives 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between 
perceived post-acquisition 
autonomy and post-acquisition 
integration success is moderated 
by the organizational archetype of 
a firm acquired by a public 
company; specifically, higher 
levels of perceived success will be 
experienced by leaders of 
professionally managed private 
firms than leaders of founder 
owned and operated firms. 
1. Founder owner-operators did not 
respond to survey limiting fair 
representation of archetype 
2. Professional managers were 
uncovered in each archetype 
3. Acquired firm leadership turnover 
may have affected results 
4. Insufficient same-firm responses 
prevented from developing firm-wide 
consensus 
1. Ensure founder participating 
through direct personal 
contact 
2. Seek responses from only 
senior most acquired firm 
leaders 
3. Seek measurement of prior to 
turnover or disqualify 
responses from respondents 
not originally with the 
acquired firm  
4. Target a larger sample 
ensuring same-firm responses- 
this may require cooperation 
of new parent firm but the fear 
of repercussion could bias 
responses 
Hypothesis 3 
The relationship between 
perceived post-acquisition 
autonomy and post-acquisition 
integration success is moderated 
by the previous experience with a 
merger or acquisition of the 
acquired firm’s leadership. 
1. Individual experience may not be 
quantitatively identifiable 
2. Organizational and individual learning 
theories may have been misapplied to 
this study  
1. Qualitative study may be 
better suited to determining 
the effects of previous 
experiences 
2. Apply greater emphasis on 
individual learning and the 
ability to manage 
organizational change on an 
individual level   
Theoretical  
Neo-institutionalism 
1. Identifiable organizational uniqueness 
may be lost during the process of 
institutional change  
1. The theory may not be 
generalizable in this situation 
Empirical  
Empirical method used 
 
1. The use of empirically based self-
report perceptual measures may have 
distorted results or limited data points 
 
1. Qualitative and narrative 
responses might add 
additional robustness to 
response data 
2. This study may be better 
suited for a grounded theory 
approach 
Methodological 
Web-based survey 
 
1. Mail invitations to internet based 
survey did not reach all parties- there 
were significant invitations returned 
as undeliverable 
1. Either increase the sample 
population or conduct 
qualitative interviews with a 
smaller sample of key 
leadership personnel   
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In summary, the negative relationship of perceived autonomy and integration 
success is not contradictory to prior studies. Support for the negative direction could 
indicate that acquired firms with greater autonomy have less integration success than 
acquired firms that are more closely managed by the leadership of the acquiring entity. A 
prevalence of industry, product and process relatedness might also have limited variance 
in autonomy allocation. The lack of data from non-retained or departed acquired firm 
representatives might also have affected the perceived autonomy responses.  
The absence of moderating effects of the acquired firm preceding organizational 
archetype may also be due to turnover or the absence of representative samples from 
founder owner-operators. A greater sampling of same-firm respondents might have 
provided a stronger representation of firm archetype affects. Very few same firm 
responses were received from the sample despite ample representation in the initial 
invitations.  
 The lack of moderation by acquired firm leaders with previous M&A experience 
could be reflective of a differential between embedded organizational and individual 
learnings, but is neither demonstrated nor repudiated by the results. Organizational and 
individual learning theories could be misapplied or might have been measured 
differently.  
The case for using a neo-institutional theory to ground the hypotheses was 
comprehensive; however, the theory may not be generalizable in the presence of 
significant dynamic change. The absence of archetype artifacts may be the result 
acquiring firm dominance that obfuscates acquired firm organizational characteristics 
during the integration process. 
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Empirically, this study may have been limited by self-report perceptive measures 
of respondents who remained with the acquired entity and had become sufficiently 
acculturated that vestiges of their previous organizational characteristics were no longer 
relevant to their responses. Qualitative analysis might have provided greater granularity.  
Finally, the use of web-based surveys has significant drawbacks including 
response rate, suspect confidentiality, historically poor delivery and response rate and 
lack of follow-up opportunity.  
Implications 
This dissertation attempted to explore perspectives of the acquired firm top team 
management and the moderating effects of post-merger antecedents to integration efforts 
on the acquired firm management. The majority of literature on post-merger integration 
accesses information from post-event public data or relies on the perspective of the 
acquiring management (McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009). The present investigation 
endeavored to measure integration effects from the acquired firm’s perspective. Although 
the anticipated relational direction of autonomy and integration success (H1) was not 
demonstrated, the negative directional findings should be noteworthy for future 
researchers and theorists. The results support the findings of two other studies by Datta 
and Grant (1990) and more recently by Zaheer et al.(2013) that also determined a 
negative relationship between autonomy allocation and integration success of recently 
acquired firms. The findings of this dissertation along with those of Datta and Grant 
(1990) and Zaheer et al. (2013) might infer that greater autonomy is allocated as a result 
of continuous or increasing success. 
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Although the moderating effects of pre-acquisition archetypes and individual 
merger and acquisition experience of acquired firm leaders did not prove to be significant 
in this study, the lack of support and the chosen approach may possibly stimulate other 
research along the same lines with different methodologies. The model did attempt to 
bridge two important gaps in literature. First, it sought to measure the acquired firm 
perspective of post integrations issues, and second, it was focused on small and medium 
acquisition events. The lack of literatures focusing on smaller firm acquisitions and target 
firm perspectives was evident by the review of extant literature. At the very least, the 
contribution to theory is the recognition of the need for future research in these areas.  
For practitioners, the dissertation highlights the complexities involved with 
acquisition integration on an individual and an organizational level. It could provide 
integration managers new perspectives to small and medium enterprise transitions and 
integration planning in relation to the type of organization acquired. Strategic planners 
and human resource analysts should benefit from the outcomes of perceived integration 
success by considering the perspective of the acquired leaders. Acquired firm leaders 
might also be sensitized to the myriad of personal and organizational ramifications 
involved in change of control and benefit from such recognitions.  
Limitations and Future Research  
There were several recognized obstacles and limitations to this study. The 
research could have been limited by the number of respondents. Although an eight 
percent response rate resulted in sufficient returns to meet power requirements, a larger 
sample may have produced different results. Difficulty reaching and enlisting survey 
participants involved in acquisitions is exacerbated by high rates of top team turnover, 
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which often accompany a merger of acquisition event. Further complications might have 
resulted from the attempt to solicit founder owner-operators who sold their business. 
Securing these participants might have been compounded by a possible unwillingness to 
share the details of a personal transaction and its aftermath.  
Shortcomings regarding the prospect of common method/common source bias 
resulting from some single source firm response did not appear to be an issue (Bowman 
& Ambrosini, 2002; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). However, the concern cannot be 
completely dismissed when using same source, self-reported data.  
Several other limitations with the study were recognized during data organization 
and analysis. This study does not measure respondents’ previous archetype experience 
prior to the acquisition. Follow-up conversations with two respondents indicated that they 
had multiple archetype experiences. Although the study investigated the acquired target 
firm organizational orientation, previous organizational type learnings from other 
archetypes could have influenced responses. Another limitation may have been the 
number and degree of involvement in previous merger or acquisition experiences of the 
respondents was not measured. The level of involvement and opportunity to affect 
decisions or interact with acquiring firms might have had an unrecognized effect on 
responses of those who indicated previous M&A experience. It was also noted that some 
acquired firms had been traded several times. Although respondents were asked about the 
most recent acquired firm merger and acquisition experience, there was no measurement 
to account for generalized organizational learning of the acquired firm.  
Substantial reliance on sourcing secondary data regarding acquiring firm size and 
age was required. Many of the acquired firms were purchased and reported through 
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subsidiaries of larger parent corporations. In some cases, the acquiring firm was two steps 
away from the publicly traded parent firm. A decision arose whether to use subsidiary or 
parent data. In most cases, the immediate operating company data was used, but when 
that information was not determinable, the ultimate parent company data was recorded. It 
is unknown if this methodology had significance on the findings.  
Another important limiting factor was the original near-term transaction 
requirement of eighteen to twenty four months. More recent studies have used evaluation 
periods of up to six years (Zaheer, 2013). Information processing that is based upon the 
retrieval of information from memory can differ among individuals (Lähteenmäki, et al., 
2002). Responses to situations may also vary from individual to individual and the 
freshness of the experience has significance upon the recall of the experience (Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991). Controlling recall distance of the acquisition event was important to 
ensure accurate responses, but the limitation may have had a restraining effect on returns. 
Some respondents reported on events outside of the prescribed eighteen to twenty four 
months. Those responses were accepted, but there was no measurement to determine 
possible recall effects.  
It is not unlikely that some snowballing effect took place. Key personal contacts 
were encouraged to share the survey with additional qualified individuals. While this is 
not a violation of accepted participant prospecting practices, there was no methodology 
included in which to segregate direct invitees from indirect invitees (Chin & Chignell, 
2007; Coomber, 1997; Kitchenham & Pfleeger, 2002). Substantial attempts to validate all 
cases were executed through the use of secondary sources. Although the target audience 
was well defined with invitations sent to prospects of firms that had been acquired within 
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18-24 months, surveys received from snowballing could have represented expanded 
windows from original close dates limiting control of sample. 
Additional prospect for a deeper inspection of the degree of family influence and 
possible effects of degree of familiness on the relationship of perceived autonomy and 
integrations could have provided additional opportunities (Habbershon, Williams, & 
Daniel, 1998). Questions regarding the degree of family ownership were presented in the 
survey, but the response rate to these question provided insufficient data for meaningful 
analysis. Only one respondent indicated a direct relationship to the founder. It was 
assumed that either the information was unknown to respondents or an unwillingness to 
share this type of information persisted. Variations in the degree of family or founder 
owned and operated businesses are a recognized limitation within the dissertation. The 
use of Family Power Experience and Culture scale (F-PEC) or similar familiness scales is 
an opportunity for future researchers directed more specifically at acquired family owned 
businesses (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). 
Acquisitions by and of international and non-domestic, nationally different firms 
could add an additional cross-cultural element to the perception of autonomy and the 
integration pace. Cultural differentiation among acquisitions in relation to the 
organizational type could also provide interesting and additional cross-cultural insight to 
perceived autonomy and acquisition integration and performance relationships.  
There are several possible opportunities to revisit the study with modified 
indicators. The first might be to conduct in-person interviews of leaders of acquired firms 
and control the balance of previous archetype orientation. The effort might also allow for 
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more specific and direct interaction with founder owner-operators to ascertain a more 
reflective representation of the founder owner-operated archetype.  
The second is a longitudinal study measuring various points along the integration 
timeline assessing changes in autonomy and the relationship with integration successes. 
Comparing both the acquiring firm perspective and the acquired firm perspectives of such 
a possible relationship could also add additional meaningful elements.  
Next could be to revisit the degree of familiness in the three organizational 
archetypes; public, professionally managed private, or founder owned and operated by 
directly targeting acquired family owned and operated businesses. A deeper investigation 
might determine a familiness effect in publically and/or privately acquired firms and 
identify additional effects of familiness in founder owned and operated or family owned 
private segments. Such an investigation could prove interesting to family business 
researchers and provide insight for practitioners. Finally, adding greater emphasis on 
cross-cultural dimensions to the area of perceived autonomy and its relationship to 
perceived integration success might prove to be important to the scholarship of global 
merger and acquisition processes. 
Conclusions 
This study investigated the relationship between perceived autonomy and 
integration success in recently acquired firm integration (H1). It further tested the 
existence of a moderating effect presented by the acquired firm organizational archetype 
within a neo-institutional context (H2). Hypothesis 3 (H3) tested for an association with 
individual organizational learning and its moderating effect upon the relationship 
113 
 
 
 
between perceived autonomy and perceived integration success during post-acquisition 
integration.  
Results from testing hypothesis 1 demonstrated a statistically significant 
relationship between perceived acquired firm leader autonomy and perceived integration 
success, but the hypothesized direction was not supported. Contrary to the original 
hypothesis, the results indicated a negative direction in the proposed relationship between 
perceived autonomy and perceived integration success. Neither Hypothesis 2, the 
proposed moderating effect of the acquired firm’ immediate organizational archetype 
prior to integration, nor Hypothesis 3, the acquired firm leaders’ experience with previous 
mergers and acquisitions, was found to have a significant impact on the relationship 
between perceived autonomy and integration success.  
The assumptions of the research hypotheses were grounded in organizational 
literatures including neo-institutional and organizational learning literatures. Previous 
research has established an association between individual successes within decision-
making control systems and has been associated with familiarity of the unique 
organizational archetype of the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
The neo-institutional school supports organizational learning as a mechanism to sustain 
the entrenched uniqueness of the firm (Reed, 2001; Suddaby, et al., 2010; Weber, 1947; 
Zucker, 1983). The results of this study, however, did not identify a significant mediating 
effect of previous work environment or organizational archetype through the perception 
of autonomy and its impact upon the perception of integration success. Additional 
deductions might infer that greater autonomy allocated to leaders of small and medium 
firms acquired by public corporations results in lower perceived integration success by 
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the acquired firm leaders. Based on the results of the data analysis, neither the acquired 
firm’s pre-acquisition structure, nor acquired firm top management experience with 
mergers and acquisitions had significant impact on the relationship of autonomy 
allocation and integration success within the confines of the analyzed data or the model 
parameters. 
The results of this dissertation support the findings of Datta and Grant (Datta & 
Grant, 1990) and Zaheer et al. (2013) that also produced a significant, but negative 
direction in a relationship between post-acquisition acquired firm autonomy and acquired 
firm integration under different but similar circumstances. This dissertation adds 
additional supports for those findings through the lens of acquired small and medium 
enterprises.
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Table 6:  Related Behavioral and Economic Choice Literatures 
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Evaluation 
Theory; 
Self-
determination 
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Individual 
adaptation to 
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are controlled by 
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decision-making 
authority can have 
significant impact on 
the attitude and 
effectiveness of 
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throughout the entire 
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 Changes in decision-
making authority can 
have negative effects 
upon locus of control, 
individual self-
efficacy (self-worth), 
self-determination. 
 When leaders are 
dissatisfied with the 
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can have detrimental 
effect on the 
performance of the 
organization. 
 
(Ajzen, 2002; Boone 
& de Brabander, 
1997; Datta, 1991; 
Deci & Ryan, 1985, 
1987; Fama, 1980; 
Graebner, 2004; 
Hambrick & Cannella 
Jr, 1993; Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986; 
Kiessling, et al., 2008; 
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2009; Lubatkin, et al., 
1999; Miller, De 
Vries, & Toulouse, 
1982; Rotter, 1966, 
1990; Rummel & 
Feinberg, 1988; Ryan, 
1982; Shanley & 
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Blackwell, 2006; 
Spector, 1982, 1988; 
Trautwein, 1990; 
Vaara, 2002; Very, et 
al., 1997; Wageman, 
1995) 
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Basis Application Contextual Synthesis Authors 
The Resource 
Based View 
Value 
determination 
of acquired 
human capital 
 The resource-based 
view suggests that a 
firm’s internal 
resources, including 
intellectual capital, 
are valuable and rare 
and these resources 
cannot be transferred 
across firms without 
incurring costs.  
 The resource-based 
view of the firm also 
supports the 
contention that 
unrelated firm 
knowledge adds 
resources and 
expertise that cannot 
be provided by the 
acquiring firm. 
 Allowing subject matter 
experts of the new entity 
to continue to express 
autonomy over the 
activities of the 
unrelated firm should be 
in the best interest of the 
firm. 
(Astley & Zajac, 
1991; Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 
2008; Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Datta & Grant, 
1990; Graebner & 
Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Karim, 2006; Karim 
& Mitchell, 2000; 
Manne, 1965; Meyer 
& Lieb-Dóczy, 2003; 
Park, 2002; Priem & 
Butler, 2001; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001; Zollo 
& Singh, 2004) 
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Theoretical 
Basis Application Contextual Synthesis Authors 
Theory of 
Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Interpretation 
of acquired 
assets and 
human capital 
 Dynamic capabilities 
are a firm's ability to 
integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal 
and external 
competencies to 
address changing 
environments. 
 Leveraging acquired 
assets in a resource-
based view is 
recognized through 
the concept of 
dynamic capabilities. 
 When the entrenched 
knowledge of the 
acquired firm is 
perceived to be a 
significant resource 
for the acquiring 
company, the 
dynamic capabilities 
are deemed valuable, 
difficult to replace 
and therefore worthy 
of allowing to remain. 
 Allowing greater 
autonomy of acquired 
firms to develop their 
own capabilities is 
more successful than 
those allowed less 
decision-making 
authority. 
 If human assets are 
new and add to the 
resource-based 
dynamic capability 
and knowledge of an 
organization, they 
will more likely be 
granted greater 
autonomy. 
(Cohen, 1990; Meyer 
& Lieb-Dóczy, 2003; 
Teece, et al., 1997; 
Villalonga & 
McGahan, 2005; 
Zollo & Singh, 2004) 
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Theoretical 
Basis Application Contextual Synthesis Authors 
Transaction Cost 
Economic 
Theory 
Integration 
costs/values of 
acquired human 
capital 
 Transaction cost 
economics are 
generally used to 
understand decisions 
of control and 
governance between 
two independent 
agents entering into 
cooperative 
endeavors. 
 The reconfiguring 
organizational 
hierarchy and 
decision authority 
when a firm is 
merged or acquired 
meets the intentions 
of transaction cost 
considerations by 
eliminating 
unnecessary 
transaction costs, 
redundancies and 
decision-making 
conflict that might 
occur. 
 Redeploying existing 
resources to augment 
new assets and 
choosing the 
deployment of those 
assets also often leads 
to the redistribution of 
power, decision-
making authority and 
hence autonomy of 
the acquired group 
and its leaders. 
(Anderson, 1988; 
Colombo & 
Delmastro, 2004; 
Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Kellermanns, Walter, 
Lechner, & Floyd, 
2005; Leiblein, 2003; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Manne, 1965; 
Oxley, 1997; Priem & 
Butler, 2001; Ranft, 
2006; Ranft, et al., 
2011; Robins, 1987; 
Villalonga & 
McGahan, 2005; 
Williamson O., 1975; 
Williamson, 1973, 
1986, 2002) 
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Theoretical 
Basis Application Contextual Synthesis Authors 
Agency Theory Autonomy 
allocation to 
retained 
acquired 
leaders; Trust 
and adaptation 
 Allocation of 
decision-making 
authority can have 
great impact on the 
agency relationship in 
a new organization. 
 The trust and faith the 
new owners have in 
an acquired leader can 
be demonstrated 
through the allocation 
of authority. 
 Management controls 
are leveraged to limit 
risks of free-rider 
issues and may be 
amplified in situations 
where the acquired 
firm was a private or 
closely held company. 
 This issue may even 
be greater in acquired 
leaders retained for a 
finite period to assist 
with transition. 
(Cannella Jr & 
Hambrick, 1993; Ellis, 
2011; Graebner, 2004; 
Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Kanter, 2009; 
Lubatkin, et al., 2005; 
Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & 
Stulz, 2003; Osterloh 
& Frey, 2000; 
Puranam, et al., 2006; 
Puranam & Srikanth, 
2007; Saxton & 
Dollinger, 2004; 
Wageman, 1995; 
Walsh & Ellwood, 
1991) 
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Basis Application Contextual Synthesis Authors 
Theory of 
Organizational 
Learning 
Embedded 
organizational 
patterns of 
control and 
institutionalized 
processes 
 Organizational 
learning refers to the 
processes of 
institutionalizing 
rules, practices, 
routines, and 
conventions and rules 
of an organization. 
 Organizational 
routines are 
inextricably cross-
linked through 
individual, group and 
organizational 
processes that involve 
tensions between the 
assimilation of new 
learnings and 
reinforcement of 
historic learnings. 
 Established learnings 
are supported through 
the conventions and 
routines 
institutionalized 
within the 
organization. 
(Barney, 1991a; 
Barney, 2001a; 
Chatterjee, 1992; 
Coff, 2002; Crossan, 
et al., 1999; Lant & 
Mezias, 1992; Levitt 
& March, 1988; 
March, 1981, 1991; 
McDonald, et al., 
2008; Meyer & Lieb-
Dóczy, 2003; Pablo, 
1994; Westphal & 
Shaw, 2005; Zollo & 
Singh, 2004) 
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Survey Materials 
 
Survey Instructions 
Thank you for taking the time to provide your feedback regarding the effects of 
perceived autonomy on integration success. This survey should take only five to 
seven minutes to complete. Please answer all questions in relation to your current 
perspectives when you take this survey. Only fully completed surveys can be used in the 
research. All responses are confidential and will not be shared. Neither you nor your 
company will be identifiable in the results. Please click your mouse on the desired 
location of each line to indicate your response to the question. Use the forward and back 
arrows at the bottom of each page to move forward and backward in the survey. The 
survey will automatically close when completed. At the end of the survey, you will be 
given an opportunity to provide an email address if you are interested in receiving the 
research results (optional). If you have any questions about this survey or the research 
results, please contact Robert W. Reich at rreich@students.kennesaw.edu at any time. 
Thank you again in advance for your valuable participation. Note: Your participation is 
voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty. The research has no risks or implied 
responsibility to the respondents. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves 
human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. 
Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to Dr. Christine 
Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 
Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407. 
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Post-Acquisition Survey Instrument  
 
Q1-Is the recently acquired firm currently operating as a stand-alone business unit or do 
the strategic objectives of the acquirer call for operations and management to 
be integrated to other existing operations?  
o Stand-alone operation 
o Integrated into existing operations of acquirer 
 
 
Q2-Using your best judgment, please rank the industry relatedness (industry segment, 
product or process) of the pre-acquisition firm. 
______ Industry segment 
______ Product offering 
______ Mfg. processes 
 
Q3-To what extent would you say the acquirers' strategic objectives for the acquired 
firm are known to the current top management team of the acquired firm? 
o Comprehensively known 
o Generally known 
o Not well known 
o Not at all known 
 
Q4-To what extent have the strategic objectives of the acquired unit changed since the 
acquisition, e.g. profit center vs. resource center. 
o Significantly changed 
o Changed a little 
o Not much changed 
o Not at all changed 
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Answer If To what extent have the strategic objectives of the acqui... significantly changed Is 
Selected 
 
Q4.2-You have indicated that the strategic objectives of the acquired firm have 
significantly changed since the business has been acquired; please indicated how. Select 
all that apply: 
o Gain access to Intellectual property or patents 
o Acquire new customers 
o Augment product line of acquiring company 
o Access plant or faculties 
o Expand geographic distribution 
o Eliminate competitive position of acquired firm 
o Supplier to acquiring firm 
 
Q5-Do you feel the performance goals of the acquiring firm have been sufficiently 
communicated to the management team of the acquired firm? 
o Thoroughly communicated 
o Reasonably communicated 
o Somewhat communicated 
o Vaguely communicated 
o Not at all communicated 
 
Q6-Do you feel the performance expectations are reasonable? 
o Very reasonable 
o Reasonable 
o Somewhat reasonable 
o Neutral 
o Somewhat unreasonable 
o Unreasonable 
o Very unreasonable 
 
Q7-Have you had direct executive-level experience with mergers or acquisitions? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Answer If Have you had direct executive-level experience with ... Yes Is Selected 
 
Q48-Please indicate how many merger or acquisition integration events you in which you 
have actively participated.  
o 1 
o 2-3 
o 4-5 
o 5-7 
o 8-9 
o 10+ 
 
Q8-Has the recently acquired firm been previously acquired within the last three years? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
 
Q9- Has the recently acquired firm acquired or merged with another firm in the last three 
years? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
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Q10 To what extent have the managers of the buying firm involved themselves in the 
decisions concerning your (acquired) firm since taking possession? 
 Your 
firm 
decides 
    Consensus, 
both firms 
decide 
    Buying 
firm 
decides 
Setting key 
performance 
goals 
       
Defining the 
portfolio of 
businesses 
       
Setting key 
competitive 
strategies 
       
Defining key 
administrative 
policies 
       
Deciding 
major capital 
investments 
       
Defining 
marketing 
budgets 
       
Developing 
marketing 
techniques 
       
Setting 
research and 
development 
(R&D) 
budgets 
       
Setting 
production 
schedules 
       
Setting senior 
manager 
rewards 
       
Defining 
recruitment 
policies 
       
Defining 
promotion 
policies 
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Q11-Assess the following areas of post-acquisition performance compared to 
your interpretation of the parent company's expectations at this point in time since the 
company has been acquired: 
 Much below 
current stage 
expectations 
  Meets current 
stage 
expectations 
  Much above 
current stage 
expectations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New product/service 
development 
       
Market development        
Sales growth rate        
Employment growth 
rate (+/-) 
       
Market share        
Operating profits        
Profit to sales ratio        
Cash flow from 
operations 
       
Return on investment        
Return on assets        
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Q12-Please indicate the organizational type of the recently acquired firm based on the 
following definitions: Select the one that BEST describes the acquired firm. 
o Public Company- a publicly traded company is a limited liability company that 
offers company securities including but not limited to; stocks, bonds and other 
equity backed instruments for sale to the public, typically through a security 
exchange. 
o Private Firm- ownership is closely held and not available to the public through 
open exchanges and is not required to meet the strict Securities and Exchange 
Commission filing requirements of public companies. Private companies may 
issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares are not traded on public 
exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering. 
o Founder owned and operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the 
founder-CEO whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not 
available to public markets. 
o Non-founder owned and operated business- a non-franchise firm that is actively 
managed by the owner, but not the founder of the firm. 
 
Answer If Please indicate the organizational type of the recen... Non-founder owned and operated 
business- a non-franchise firm that is actively managed by the owner, but not the founder of the 
firm. Is Selected 
Q12.1-Relationship to the founder 
o No relation 
o Sibling 
o 1st generation 
o 2nd generation 
o Family member CEO representing multiple family member ownership 
o Related by marriage 
o adopted 
o Other relation 
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Answer If Please indicate the organizational type of the ... Private Firm- ownership is 
closely held and not available to the public through open exchanges and are not required 
to meet the strict Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public 
companies. Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares 
are not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering. Is 
Selected Or Please indicate the organizational type of the ... Family founder owned and 
operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the founder-CEO whose stock is 
closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not available to public markets. Is 
Selected 
 
Q12.2-Please indicate the percentage (%) of family ownership if known, otherwise leave 
blank and continue to next question.  
• Ownership means ownership of stock or company capital.  
• Founder owned and operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the founder-
CEO whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not available to 
public markets.  
• Family is defined as a group of persons including siblings and those who are offspring 
of a couple (no matter what generation) and their in-laws as well as their legally adopted 
children.  
• Non-family refers to unrelated institutional or private holders of capital stock. 
 Founder Other family members 
of founder 
Non-family 
%    
 
Q13-Please identify your current responsibility level in the acquired firm: 
o Senior-most executive (e.g. President, CEO) 
o Top management team member (other than senior-most executive) 
o Other management 
o Non-management 
 
Q14-Please identify whether the current (acquired) firm's senior executive is a retained 
executive from the acquired firm or installed by the acquiring firm from outside the 
acquired organization during post acquisition activities. 
o Retained 
o Installed (pre-integration activities) 
o Installed sometime during the integration process 
 
Answer If Please identify whether the current (acquired) firm's se... Installed sometime 
during the integration process Is Selected 
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Q14.2-a Please indicate when the current installed leader assumed responsibility for the 
acquired entity. 
o Assumed responsibilities immediately following change of ownership 
o Replaced retained leader during post-acquisition activities 
o Replaced installed leader during post acquisition activities 
 
Answer If Please identify whether your current (acquired) firm's se... Installed (pre-integration 
activities) Is Selected 
 
Q14.2-b-If leader was installed, please indicated the immediate source. This question 
does not pertain to leaders retained through target acquisition. 
o Installed from within parent company (acquirer) 
o Installed from outside public firm 
o Installed from outside private firm 
 
Q15-How many full time employees were in the (acquired) firm at the time of 
acquisition? 
 
Q16-What year was the (acquired) firm founded? If unknown, please proceed to next 
question. 
 
Q18-The following descriptive questions are demographic in nature and will simply 
identify unique characteristics of the respondents. Answering these questions is not 
required for data gathering of the key research questions. The following questions are 
voluntary and remain confidential. If you do not wish to provide this information, please 
proceed to question 19. This standard is in compliance with the definitions and 
procedures included in the 1997 revision of the OMB Statistical Policy Directive No. 15 
and the U.S. Department of Education Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and 
Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the Department of Education (Federal Register, Vol. 
72, No. 202, 10/19/2008).  
 
Q18.1-Your gender 
o Male 
o Female 
 
Q18.2-Age 
______ Click to select choice  
 
  
173 
 
 
 
Q18.3-What is the highest educational level you have achieved 
o High School degree 
o Some college 
o College degree 
o Graduate degree (MBA, MS, MA etc.) 
o Post graduate work 
o Post Graduate Degree (PhD, DBA, Ed.D., MD etc.) 
 
Q18.4-What is your national origin? 
o North American 
o South American 
o Western Europe 
o Eastern Europe 
o Asia Pacific 
o Middle Eastern 
o Arab 
o Indian 
 
Q18.5-What is your Ethnic origin? 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Asian 
o Black or African American 
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
o White 
o Two or more races ____________________ 
 
Q18.6-Please enter your current position/title 
 
Q19-If you would like to receive a synopsis of the survey results, please provide your 
name and e-mail address below. Your identity and contact information will remain 
confidential. Thank you for participating. Please allow up to 90 days for results. Click to 
write the question text 
Name ____________________ 
Firm ____________________ 
Email-address ____________________ 
o I am interested in participating in future merger and acquisition research. 
o I am not interested in participating in future merger and acquisition research.
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Survey Cover Letter 
 
 
 
Date XXXX 
 
Dear __________, 
 
I am a fellow business leader whose company has been acquired, and has in turn participated in the acquisition of other 
firms. The rising challenges that leaders like us face during the transition to new ownership can prove challenging for 
management, employees, and shareholders. 
 
Few studies have focused on the link between changes in autonomy or decision-making authority and integration 
success. That is where I need your help. I have recently teamed up with Kennesaw State University in Kennesaw, 
Georgia to conduct focused research on the relationship between acquired firm autonomy and integration performance. 
Public records indicate that your firm has been recently acquired. I am seeking your professional expertise in an effort 
to understand the effects of management autonomy on acquired firm performance to assist other leaders and managers 
in similar circumstances.  
 
All I am asking is that you complete a short survey. The electronic survey (click here or the links below) contains fewer 
than 50 questions and pre-tests indicate it may be completed in less than 10 minutes. Other members of your 
management team may also receive a survey invitation. The research is designed to incorporate multiple responses 
from the same firm. Rest assured that all surveys will remain completely confidential and neither you nor your 
organization will be identifiable in the results.  
 
This research project is not affiliated with any firm or commercial enterprise and the results are intended for academic 
use only. Survey results will be available to those who participate. Should you have any questions about the study or its 
application, please contact me, Robert W. Reich at rreich@students.kennesaw.edu or (865) 405-2584.  
 
Your experience and expertise with this subject will have meaningful and important impact on the effort to enhance the 
success of mergers and acquisitions in the future. Fellow professionals and I thank you for your participation. 
 
If you are receiving this letter via the internet, click here to start the survey: Link to Survey. If you are receiving this 
invitation by mail post, you may type https://coles.qualtrics.com/autonomy.edu into your internet browser or use your 
mobile reader to begin the survey. 
 
Note: Your participation is voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty. The research has no risks or implied 
responsibility to the respondents. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out 
under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be 
addressed to Dr. Christine Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 
Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407. 
 
Most Sincerely, 
 
Robert W. Reich 
Kennesaw State University 
 
